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Who Cares—and Does It Matter? 
Measuring Wage Penalties for Caring Work  
 
Abstract 
Economists and sociologists have proposed arguments for why there can exist wage penalties for work 
involving helping and caring for others, penalties borne disproportionately by women. Evidence on wage 
penalties is neither abundant nor compelling. We examine wage differentials associated with caring jobs 
using multiple years of Current Population Survey (CPS) earnings files matched to O*NET job descriptors 
that provide continuous measures of ‘assisting and caring’ and ‘concern’ for others across all 
occupations. This approach differs from prior studies that assume occupations either do or do not 
require a high level of caring. Cross-section and longitudinal analyses are used to examine wage 
differences associated with the level of caring, conditioned on worker, location, and job attributes. 
Wage level estimates suggest substantive caring penalties, particularly among men. Longitudinal 
estimates based on wage changes among job switchers indicate smaller wage penalties, our preferred 
estimate being a 2 percent wage penalty resulting from a one standard deviation increase in our caring 
index. We find little difference in caring wage gaps across the earnings distribution. Measuring mean 
levels of caring across the U.S. labor market over nearly thirty years, we find a steady upward trend, but 
overall changes are small and there is no evidence of convergence between women and men. 
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1. Introduction 
Caring labor has been described as jobs in which workers “provide a face-to-face service that 
develops the human capabilities of the recipient” (England et al., 2002, p. 455).1 Health, child, and elder 
care services, along with education, account for a substantial share of paid employment and personal 
consumption expenditures in the U.S. (Folbre 2008). It is widely believed that there exist wage penalties 
for caring work. Research in economics and sociology provides theoretical rationales for why caring 
penalties can exist.2 Yet there are surprisingly few empirical analyses examining whether such wage 
penalties exist and, if so, the sources of these penalties.  
The approach taken by economists and other social scientists – and in our study – is to examine 
whether wages for caring jobs are high or low relative to similarly skilled workers in otherwise similar 
jobs and locations. The term “caring penalty” is used to mean that among workers with similar skills in 
similar locations working in similar jobs (apart from caring), lower wages are found in jobs requiring 
higher levels of caring. In previous work, England et al. (2002) find overall wage penalties for caring labor 
in the U.S. They find that the type of care work matters, with nurses enjoying a significant wage 
premium and workers in most other caring occupations suffering penalties. Their study, as well as others 
in the literature, assumes a dichotomy in care work with occupations classified as either involving or not 
involving a high degree of care.  
The question of whether there exist significant wage penalties for caring work is important for 
several reasons. Depending on the source, wage penalties for care work might be viewed as an equity 
problem if the incidence of such penalties disproportionately affects women (or other groups). And 
penalties might be viewed as a social and economic problem if low wages in the care sector create 
higher than optimal turnover and low quality care in socially valuable jobs (England et al., 2002). 
Moreover, a finding of sizable wage gaps among truly similar workers in similar jobs (apart from the 
degree of caring) can raise the question of whether labor market outcomes deviate substantially from 
what is predicted by standard theory, depending on the source of these differentials.  
Our paper provides evidence intended to enhance knowledge about wage differences 
associated with caring. In what follows, we first discuss how standard theory might account for wage 
                                                          
1 England et al. refer to “human capabilities” as “health, skills, or proclivities that are useful to oneself or others.” 
“Caring labor” refers to jobs (occupations) that require caring tasks. The literature attempts to estimate wage 
differences among jobs that involve high and low levels of caring tasks. This is not necessarily the same thing as 
wage differences between workers who do and do not have caring attitudes and behaviors. Labor market sorting 
no doubt results in caring persons working disproportionately in jobs with caring tasks.  
2 Works include England and Folbre (1999), Folbre and Nelson (2000), England (2005) and Folbre (2006, 2008, 2012).  
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penalties for caring work. We then provide detailed empirical analysis on how wages differ across 
workers and jobs with respect to caring attributes. To do so, we match employee data from Current 
Population Survey (CPS) earnings files with detailed occupational job descriptors, including multiple 
measures of caring, from the 2007 Occupational Information Network (O*NET). Cross section analysis is 
conducted using large CPS data files for 2006-2008. Longitudinal analysis is conducted using large CPS 
panels for worker-year-pairs from 2003/4 to 2008/9, with each pair consisting of two-observations per 
worker, one year apart. The panel analysis identifies differentials for caring work based on wage changes 
among job switchers who increase or decrease the required levels of caring in their jobs. As compared to 
prior literature, our analysis provides more recent evidence, uses large cross-sectional and panel 
samples of workers, provides multiple continuous (rather than categorical) measures of caring (and 
other) job attributes, and examines wage differentials associated with these measures in a 
comprehensive fashion. 
2. Theoretical Rationales 
There is a literature in sociology and economics in which researchers propose theories that 
might explain wage penalties for care work.3 The mechanisms emphasized by sociologists, while not 
necessarily described using an economic framework, are largely compatible with economic theory once 
framed in language familiar to economists. In the remainder of this section, we use standard theory to 
discuss how systematic wage differentials for caring work may arise in the labor market.  
The most obvious explanation for wage differentials associated with caring work is the theory of 
compensating differentials, whose sterling pedigree (i.e., Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations) is unrivaled. 
Some individuals will derive greater utility from work characterized by a high degree of caring for and 
helping others than from work that is not. And these workers may be disproportionately female. If such 
preferences are sufficiently widespread so that they are relevant at the margin (i.e., where labor supply 
and demand intersect) and not inframarginal, theory suggests that jobs involving high levels of caring 
will bear a wage penalty compared to jobs with otherwise similar working conditions and skills.  
Compensating differentials are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows labor demand and supply for 
an occupation that involves a high level of caring. To illustrate our point, we show a diagram in which 
workers are equivalent except that one group prefers work in a caring job, while other workers are 
indifferent to (or dislike) caring tasks. The lower portion of the supply curve SL represents occupation 
labor supply for the first group of workers, whose reservation wage is W1. The upper portion of SL 
                                                          
3 See England and Folbre (1999); England et al. (2002); England (2005); and Barron and West (2013). 
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represents labor supply for the second group, whose reservation wage is W2. In this simple case, if labor 
demand in the occupation is relatively low at D1, we will see an equilibrium with wage W1 and 
employment L1, the latter including only workers who prefer caring jobs. At a high level of demand D2, 
the equilibrium wage is W2, a higher wage for both groups of workers. The more general case is that 
there is a continuum of preferences among workers leading to an upward sloping SL.4 The lower the 
level of demand, the lower the wage and thus “penalties” (negative compensating differentials) exist for 
caring work. At high levels of demand, “penalties” should decrease and eventually disappear with 
sufficiently high demand. If demand is high and workers at the margin dislike caring work, then we 
should see a wage “premium” (positive compensating differentials).  
Researchers have referred to this “preference” argument as the “intrinsic rewards” or “prisoner 
of love” explanation (England and Folbre, 1999, and England, 2005, respectively). Economists are 
inclined to treat preferences as more or less freely chosen and deserving to be respected in markets. 
The concern is that selection into caring jobs may not fully reflect free choice, being seen instead as an 
obligation driven by societal expectations (hence the “prisoner of love” label).  
“Devaluation” is a prevalent theory for a caring wage penalty emerging from sociology. It makes 
the assumption that society values whatever is produced by women less than what is produced by men; 
hence, caring labor pays less because women disproportionately work in caring jobs (England et al., 
2002). A devaluation explanation can be reconciled with standard micro theory to the extent that 
devaluation means that individuals, in their roles as consumers, employers, voters, etc. have a lower 
willingness to pay for services typically provided by women. Combining lower labor demand with 
upward sloping long-run labor supply curves due to heterogeneous skill and job preferences can then 
produce wage differences between women and men and caring versus non-caring work.5 
Independent of women’s preferences for caring work, if there exists substantial employer-based 
discrimination against women in higher-paying non-caring jobs, women may be “crowded” into caring 
sectors, lowering equilibrium wages in caring jobs and denying women opportunities to accumulate 
human capital outside that sector. This characterization of the U.S. labor market may nicely fit the first 
three-quarters of the twentieth century, but over the last 40 years or so it has become less accurate.6  
                                                          
4 In labor textbooks (e.g., Borjas, 2013, p. 213), the relationship between wages and job attributes is typically 
shown as a hedonic wage function formed by the tangencies of workers’ indifference curves and firms’ isoprofit 
curves, an approach developed by Thaler and Rosen (1976). 
5 Although gender discrimination in the workplace is illegal, lower wages resulting from labor supply preferences 
and “devalued” work would not typically be illegal.  
6 Women were also crowded into many low-pay, low-caring clerical and factory jobs. 
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An additional argument in the literature is that caring labor is disproportionately concentrated 
in the public sector (Barron and West, 2013; Folbre 2012), an outcome that we will subsequently 
document. If the political process produces a relatively low willingness to pay for public services that 
most involve caring, then low wages can result. In our empirical work, we separately examine how wage 
outcomes vary with respect to caring in the private and public sectors.  
Prior studies have identified reasons one might see lower wages in caring jobs. One can also 
identify channels that might produce higher wages in caring jobs, or at least mitigate penalties. As 
mentioned in our discussion of compensating differentials, if demand for caring jobs is sufficiently high 
such that the marginal worker receives disutility for caring tasks, then we should see positive rather than 
negative compensating differentials. Efficiency-wage theory and theories of reciprocity and gift 
exchange suggest that caring jobs might have high rather than low wages. Measuring and monitoring 
the quality of care services provided by an employee can be difficult for employers or customers (e.g., 
parents selecting child care), so high wages may arise to attract more-able workers, reduce shirking, 
lower turnover rates, and foster gift-exchange between employees and the employer/customer (Fehr 
and Gächter 2000; Borjas 2013, pp. 484-493). It seems plausible to us that such forces might well 
mitigate to some (unknown) degree negative wage effects resulting from worker labor supply (i.e., 
intrinsic rewards for care work) and demand-side devaluation of caring jobs.  
A final consideration is whether we should expect different wage-caring gradients for women 
and men, given that each group’s selection into caring jobs can differ. Women bear a disproportionate 
share of caring, assisting, and teaching others within households. The acquired skills, preferences, and 
societal norms that accompany such a household division of labor make it more likely that in the labor 
market women sort into jobs requiring similar or complementary skills to those provided in the home. If 
women (on average) are particularly adept at caring tasks, we may observe smaller wage penalties for 
caring work among women than among men (i.e., biased estimates due to unmeasured productivity). A 
related argument stems from recent work by Heckman (e.g., Heckman and Kautz 2012) regarding the 
importance of noncognitive skills (e.g., conscientiousness) on success in the labor market and 
elsewhere. If women (on average) have higher levels of “people” skills valued in jobs involving high 
levels of caring, these unmeasured person-specific skills should lead to higher wages and weaker 
estimates of caring wage penalties for women than for men using cross-sectional analysis. As discussed 
subsequently, panel estimates, wherein caring wage differentials are measured by wage changes among 
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workers switching between high and low caring jobs, should account for these person fixed effects.7 
3. Previous Evidence  
There is a limited number of empirical studies providing in depth analysis of caring wage 
differentials. We summarize two studies that are most similar to our work in terms of the research 
question being addressed. England et al. (2002) analyze the relative pay of caring labor in the U.S. using 
individual longitudinal data from the NLSY79 for the years 1982-1993. Their sample consists of 10,670 
respondents for whom they had at least two years of detailed employment data. Respondents were 
ages 16-23 in the initial year of their sample (1982) and 28-35 in the final year (1993).8 The authors 
create an indicator variable designating caring occupations, these being primarily in health care or 
education, plus a handful of other occupations (childcare workers, librarians, counselors, social workers, 
clergy and other religious workers, and recreation and fitness workers). An advantage of their data set is 
that they are able to construct measures of previous part-time and full-time work experience, job 
tenure, and breaks in employment. Such measures are particularly important for cross-sectional 
analysis, but effectively fall out in longitudinal analysis (through worker fixed effects or wage change 
analysis), the method favored in their study and in our subsequent analysis. In order to control for 
occupational skill, they use factor analysis to create a measure of cognitive skills demanded by an 
occupation based on job descriptors in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.9 Their fixed-effects wage 
regression models, with dummies for individuals and years, identify the wage effect of caring based on 
individuals who switch between care and non-care occupations. They perform their analysis separately 
for men and women, finding significant wage penalties of 5% for women and 6% for men. 
When England et al. (2002) disaggregate care work into seven types, they find large 
heterogeneity in the estimated wage gaps. Female childcare workers were found to face large penalties. 
Surprisingly, doctors were found to suffer substantive wage penalties (men: 17%; women: 10%) while 
the category containing nurses, therapists, and medical assistants, referred to as ‘other medical’, 
                                                          
7 We do not explore the possible effect of monopsonistic labor markets, where a limited number of employers and 
little worker mobility across firms leads to lower wages. As discussed in Manning (2003) and Webber (2013), if 
women have relatively less job-to-job mobility than do men, their wages are likely to be lower. Although empirical 
tests of monopsony models might help explain lower wages for women than men they do not necessarily explain 
lower wages for caring than non-caring jobs, absent evidence that job-to-job mobility is lower in high caring than in 
low caring jobs. 
8 They restricted their sample to respondents who worked either part- or full-time for at least two years during the 
sample period (person-years with missing values or extremely low or high hourly earnings were also dropped). 
9 The DOT was the precursor to O*NET, the latter being used in our analysis to construct job attribute indices using 
factor analysis. While the DOT included a small number of job descriptors with a limited range of integer coding, 
O*NET contains several hundred job skill/task and working condition attributes, each providing non-categorical 
continuous ratings. O*NET is discussed subsequently in our data section. 
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enjoyed a wage premium (men: 4%; women: 8%). The result for doctors is counterintuitive, but likely 
arises from age-truncation in the sample, as noted by the authors (England, et al. 2002, p. 468). The 
result regarding nurses is consistent with subsequent nursing studies, although Hirsch and Schumacher 
(2012) show that such estimates overstate relative nursing wages.10  
The data and analysis in England et al. (2002) have advantages and limitations as compared to 
our work. The principal advantage is the NLSY longitudinal structure and the detailed information 
available on individuals and households over time. That said, the NLSY79 sample period covered 1983-
1992, so all workers were under age 36 and were observed early in their careers, as noted by the 
authors. Their period of analysis, roughly twenty years earlier than in our study, may not reflect the 
experience of more recent cohorts, with occupational shifts among women due to evolving social norms 
and increased educational attainment, or the substantial changes in overall labor market rewards to skill 
and the skill content of jobs. And our CPS panels provide relatively larger samples of occupation 
switchers than does the NLSY, having roughly 19 and 22 thousand unique worker job switchers for 
women and men, respectively.  
In a recent study, Barron and West (2013) analyze wage differentials for caring work in the 
British labor market. They use 17 waves of the British Household Panel Survey covering the years 1991 
to 2007, consisting of annual accounts of an individual’s education, employment, and family 
characteristics. They estimate a regression model that includes individual random effects (not fixed 
effects) and year fixed effects. Similar to England et al. (2002), Barron and West disaggregate care work 
into six specific types (doctors, nurses, teachers, childcare, nursing assistant, and welfare) by using self-
reported job descriptions matched to occupation codes. Their empirical work combines men and 
women (a male dummy is included), thus not allowing for different caring penalties (rewards) for 
women and men. Barron and West rely on a Heckman selection correction procedure to account for the 
attrition of low-wage workers from the labor force, but do not discuss what exclusion restriction (if any) 
was used or how their selection results compare with OLS, thus making interpretation difficult. The 
authors construct different comparison groups based on broad occupation (described as socioeconomic 
groups) for each group of care workers.  
Barron and West obtain wage differential estimates indicating that doctors earn 33% more, 
nurses 10% more, and teachers 5% more than their peers in non-caring occupations, while nursing 
                                                          
10 Hirsch and Schumacher (2012) show that nursing/non-nursing wage gaps shrink substantially once one: (a) 
controls for occupation skill requirements and working conditions and, (b) accounts for bias in estimating log 
(percentage) wage differentials with OLS when comparing treatment groups with low wage dispersion (nurses) to 
broad comparison groups with much higher dispersion (all college-educated women). See Blackburn (2007). 
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assistants earn 6% less, welfare workers 18% less, and childcare workers 21% less than their peers in 
non-caring occupations. Unlike England et al. (2002) and our subsequent analysis, Barron and West do 
not include measures of occupational skills, nor do they account for worker fixed effects. We suspect 
that their large caring wage gap estimates (negative and positive) may reflect substantial skill 
differences between their caring and non-caring occupations and workers. And, as the authors point 
out, important differences exist between the U.S. and U.K. labor markets, in particular, the U.K.’s 
nationalized health care and education systems in which wages are set by national negotiations (Barron 
and West, 2013). 
4. Data Sources and Descriptive Evidence on Caring Jobs 
The data sets used in our analysis are constructed from two principal sources, the Current 
Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) monthly earnings files, containing worker-level 
data, and the Occupational Information Network (O*NET), providing occupational descriptors that can 
be matched to the CPS.11 A cross-sectional data set is created by pooling 36 monthly CPS-ORG files for 
January 2006 through December 2008, with 166,009 women and 168,760 men included in the 
estimation sample. Since the CPS includes households in the same month in two consecutive years, we 
are able to construct a large panel data set consisting of about forty-thousand worker-year pairs of 
occupation switchers from 2003/4 to 2008/9 of which 18,981 are women and 21,689 men.12  
An occupational-level data set constructed from a 2007 edition of O*NET provides several 
hundred job attributes. Most O*NET variables provide ratings of the skills and various tasks required to 
perform the job or the environment of a worker in the job. We use 206 O*NET variables, most measured 
on scale indicating the level to which a descriptor is required or needed to perform the occupation. 
Most O*NET variables are measured on a scale from 0-to-7 or 1-to-5, with reported values being a 
continuous number based on ratings provided by job analysts based on site visits and reports from job 
                                                          
11 The CPS-ORG data is jointly sponsored by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) while 
O*NET is sponsored by the Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration (USDOL/ETA). 
12 The time period for the panel was determined by there being time-consistent detailed Census occupation codes 
in the CPS for the years 2003-2009. For details on the methods used to match individuals across years in CPS 
earnings files, see the appendix in Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) and Madrian and Lefgren (2000). Matching is 
conducted with the goal of including only pairs matched with near certainty (using household and person 
identifiers and demographic checks), even if it means excluding valid pairs that do not satisfy all match criteria. In 
addition, we exclude all individual observations with imputed earnings in the pooled cross section analysis and all 
earnings pairs with either or both years imputed in the panel analysis. In the CPS-ORG files, earnings non-
respondents are assigned the earnings of a “similar” donor based on broad but not detailed occupation. Hence, 
the estimates of coefficients on caring or other occupation-based variables will be attenuated (so-called “match 
bias”) if imputed earners are included. See Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) for a detailed discussion of CPS imputation 
methods, resulting biases, and alternative corrections for such biases. Simply omitting imputed earners avoids 
imputation match bias and provides estimates highly similar to more complex correction methods.  
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incumbents.13 We scale all O*NET measures from zero to one to provide a comparable scale.14   
In line with prior literature, we regard care work as involving activities and requirements in jobs 
characterized by high levels of non-routine interactive job tasks that directly foster recipients’ social, 
emotional, intellectual, and/or physical well-being. Typically, the delivery and quality of caring job 
skills/tasks depend on workers providing individualized services and establishing a personal relationship 
with the recipient.15 Consequently, we identify two O*NET occupational attribute variables as most 
directly measuring the level of caring work: ‘assisting & caring for others’ (A&C) and ‘concern for others’. 
We examine these O*NET caring measures separately and jointly, using factor analysis to construct a 
latent factor combining the two measures, which we refer to as the ‘caring’ index. Table 1 provides the 
definition for the O*NET caring and developing/teaching attributes described below. 
The ‘assisting & caring for others’ variable is designed to measure job requirements. A&C is 
included in a category of O*NET attributes labeled ‘communicating and interacting with others’, which is 
one of the multiple categories under the broader category of ‘generalized work activities’, all part of the 
larger content category ‘occupational requirements’. The ‘concern for others’ measure, on the other 
hand, falls under the broad content category ‘worker characteristics’, with a sub-heading of ‘work styles’ 
and the more narrow sub-heading ‘interpersonal orientation’. The ‘A&C’ and ‘concern’ measures have a 
high degree of statistical overlap. That said, A&C is a job descriptor designed to measure the level of 
required caring work activity in an occupation, whereas ‘concern’ is designed as a worker descriptor that 
identifies personal characteristics needed for job performance and for a good occupational match. 
In addition to the caring and concern measures, we construct a ‘developing/teaching’ or D/T 
factor index, which loads four O*NET descriptors: ‘developing & building teams’, ‘training & teaching 
others’, ‘coaching & developing others’, and ‘instructing’. As was the case for the A&C measure, the four 
D/T descriptors describe required occupational work activities. The D/T measures are not intended to 
directly measure caring wage effects. Because prior studies typically designate teaching jobs as caring 
jobs, it is important that we separately examine the relationship between wages and D/T tasks as well as 
                                                          
13 We use the O*NET data set previously used in Hirsch and Schumacher (2012). They provide a more detailed 
description of its construction and merger with the CPS, Section 4 of their paper provides discussion of the 
selection of variables used to construct the skill and working condition indices. Most O*NET descriptors are 
measured by both required level and importance. The two rankings are highly collinear; we use levels.  
14 In order to normalize ratings for attributes using a different scale, we follow an approach similar to the one used 
by the USDOL; namely score  𝑆 = (
𝑂−𝐿
𝐻−𝐿
), where O is the original rating score on the rating scale used, H is the 
highest possible score on the rating scale used, and L  is the lowest possible score on the rating scale used.  
15 Our definition is similar to England et al. (2002), but also incorporates the concepts of “routine versus 
nonroutine” and “interactive” job tasks developed in Autor et al. (2003) in their analysis of information technology 
(IT) on employment and wages. Each of these studies uses DOT occupation job descriptors to classify jobs. 
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wages and caring tasks. The advantage of our approach is that all occupations are included, each with 
distinct measures of levels of caring and D/T, allowing us to estimate separate wage gradients with 
respect to each.  
In addition to the job caring indices, we construct two broad factor indices, one reflecting 
occupation job skill and task requirements and a second reflecting job working conditions.16 Our ‘job 
skills index’ includes 162 O*NET job skill/task variables and heavily loads cognitive skills. For example, 
heavily-loaded attributes include levels of critical thinking, judgment and decision making, monitoring, 
written expression, speaking, active listening, active learning, negotiation, and persuasion. A second 
factor index – a ‘working conditions index’ – is constructed by loading 38 O*NET variables measuring 
(mostly) physical working conditions. This index heavily loads attributes such as required types of 
strength, extreme temperatures, extremely bright or inadequate lighting, exposure to contaminants, 
cramped work space or awkward position, exposure to injuries, and exposure to hazardous equipment. 
The skills index is a particularly important control variable in the wage analysis for two reasons. 
First, the job skills index is a strong correlate of wages and, second, caring jobs vary greatly in their 
required level of skill, some involving minimal training and low levels of cognitive skills, while others are 
among the most highly-skilled jobs in the economy. Caring jobs also vary with respect to working 
conditions, although these attributes have far weaker effects on wages than do skills. As recognized in 
the literature, it is difficult to identify compensable working conditions due to (a) heterogeneous 
preferences and sorting with respect to job attributes and (b) because job disamenities tend to be 
negatively correlated with unmeasured worker skills (Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard 1992). 
The O*NET attributes and factor indices measuring occupation skills, working conditions, and 
the various measures of caring are matched by detailed occupation to both the 2006-2008 CPS cross-
sections and the 2003/4-2008/9 CPS panel data sets. Table 2 provides the unweighted means and 
standard deviations for women and men for the O*NET measures and indices, plus the earnings 
measure used in the CPS, as described below.17  
Our earnings measure is the natural log of average hourly earnings across all hours worked, with 
earnings inclusive of tips, overtime, and commissions, for individual worker i, in constant 2008 dollars. In 
our regression models (section 5), we include all non-student workers ages 18 to 65 with hourly wage 
values between three and one hundred fifty dollars. We exclude full-time students (reported for those 
                                                          
16 Our approach in forming the O*NET skills and working condition indices follows Hirsch and Schumacher (2012). 
For further details on the O*NET to CPS match, see their paper. 
17 Differences between sample-weighted and unweighted descriptive statistics and regression analyses are trivial.  
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under age 25) and observations in which workers’ earnings are not reported and instead imputed by 
Census, since workers’ detailed occupation is not a hot deck match attribute used to assign donor 
earnings to non-respondents (Bollinger and Hirsch 2006, Table 1). The same sample exclusions are 
applied to the panel analysis covering 2003/4 – 2008/9, where the dependent variable is the one-year 
change in the log of average hourly earnings. Were imputed earners included, coefficient estimates 
regarding caring attributes in the wage level analysis would be attenuated, whereas panel estimates 
would be severely biased toward the cross-section results (see Bollinger and Hirsch 2006).18  
Turning to Table 2, the raw gender gap is 0.19 log points (roughly 20%), with women’s mean 
hourly earnings $4.38 less than that for men and somewhat less dispersed.19 The other variables in Table 
2 are occupation measures, with the means compiled across workers (i.e., equivalent to a sample-
weighted mean across occupations). We use six ‘caring’ attributes from O*NET, measured in levels and 
each scaled between 0 and 1. The two attributes used to measure caring are ‘assisting & caring for 
others’ and ‘concern for others’. Women have higher averages than do men for each, 0.46 versus 0.39 
for the former and 0.78 versus 0.69 for the latter. Our ‘caring’ factor index that combines these two 
attributes has a substantially higher value for women than men, the difference exceeding a half 
standard deviation.  
Table 2 also presents means for the four occupational measures emphasizing aspects of team 
development, training, coaching, and instructing. Here, women and men have highly similar levels for 
each. Even if these job attributes were associated with substantial differences in wages, this would 
produce minimal changes in the gender wage gap. We combine these four O*NET attributes into the 
factor index labeled ‘developing/teaching’ (D/T).  
To get a feel for how various occupations are rated by O*NET with respect to ‘assisting & caring 
for others’ and ‘concern for others’, in Table 3 we provide ratings for selected occupations that have 
very high and low ratings, plus many of the larger occupations in the economy. What can be clearly seen 
in Table 3 is that many of the highest ranked occupations are health care jobs in which workers directly 
interact with individuals. Notable among the occupations ranked one-to-five in ‘assisting & caring’ 
(physician assistants, physicians and surgeons, LPN/LVNs, respiratory therapists, and registered nurses), 
are the substantial differences in required skills and pay. This reinforces our previous statement that in 
                                                          
18 Inclusion of imputed earners does not correct for (possible) non-ignorable response bias, since included non-
respondents are assigned the earnings of respondents. One can reweight the respondent sample by the inverse 
probability of response, which rebalances the sample based on measured attributes. But in practice IPW regression 
results are nearly identical to those using unweighted respondent samples. See Bollinger and Hirsch (2006, 2013). 
19 Throughout the paper we will treat log wage gaps as approximate percentage differentials, with the implicit 
wage base being in between the average for women and men (roughly the geometric mean). 
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order to measure wage differences associated with caring, it is essential to have good controls for 
individual worker skills and job skill requirements. Occupations requiring minimal levels of ‘assisting & 
caring’ include engineers, mathematicians, machinists, and sales representatives. Examining the 
rankings for ‘concern for others’ shows that there is a strong correlation with ‘assisting & caring’’ but 
that an occupation can be ranked high (or low) using one measure but not the other. The sales 
representatives occupation involves few ‘assisting & caring’ tasks, but ‘concern for others’ is a worker 
attribute that is helpful in performing a sales job. Ambulance drivers are ranked 8th highest in ‘assisting 
& caring’ but 71st in ‘concern’ for others.  
A principal takeaway from Table 3 is that all jobs require tasks involving some degree of 
‘assisting & caring’ and that adequate performance in all jobs requires that workers have some degree 
of ‘concern’ for others. Characterizing occupations as either caring or not provides a useful shorthand 
for discussion. But in order to statistically estimate the relationship between market wages and caring, it 
makes sense to examine multiple caring measures and explicitly account for the required levels of care 
for each. Rather than estimating wage differentials between jobs designated as caring or not, we 
estimate labor market wage gradients with respect to the degree of caring across all occupations.  
Table 4 reports the simple pairwise correlations between earnings, gender, and the various 
O*NET job descriptors and indices. The O*NET descriptors ‘assisting & caring for others’ and ‘concern 
for others’ have a 0.71 correlation. The caring index combining these two caring measures is positively 
correlated with our comprehensive job skill index (0.39), negatively correlated with the index of physical 
working conditions (-0.21), positively but weakly correlated with the log wage (0.07), and strongly 
correlated with the share of women in an occupation (0.54). The developing/teaching index is positively 
correlated with wages and the caring measures, but largely uncorrelated with gender.  
Figure 2 shows smoothed distributions of the indices for caring and developing/teaching across 
the labor market (absent smoothing one observes multiple “mini-peaks” at index values attached to 
large occupations). Recall that by construction, the means of the factor indices, constructed for women 
and men combined, have a zero mean and s.d. of 1.0. In Figure 2, the caring index distribution for 
women is everywhere to the right of the male distribution, demonstrating both higher and more 
dispersed levels of job caring than seen among men. By contrast, the D/T index, which combines the 
four pertinent O*NET measures, displays differences between women and men, but is not 
systematically higher for one group or the other. The left tails and peaks of the two distributions are 
similar, but beyond the peaks, men are more heavily represented in occupations requiring mid-to-high 
levels of D/T, while women are more heavily represented in occupations with the highest levels of D/T.  
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In order to use our 2007 version of O*NET, which is matched to the 2000 Census occupation 
codes (COC), to study measure trends in caring work over a long time period, it is necessary to 
approximate a time-consistent set of occupation codes. The 2000 COC codes, used in the CPS during 
2003-2010, and the 1990 COC used in the CPS during 1992-2002, were converted back to 1980 COC 
codes using a probabilistic mapping provided by Census.20 Beginning with the 2007 O*NET values 
matched to the 2000 COC codes for all wage and salary workers using the 2006-2008 CPS, we then 
recalculated each O*NET attribute value for the large 2006-2008 sample based on their 1980 COC codes. 
Once we had O*NET values based on the 1980 COC codes, we then calculated the means of our O*NET 
measures of caring and D/T for all wage and salary workers ages 16 and over from 1983 through 2010. 
We find no discontinuity in our series associated with occupational code breakpoints (1991 vs. 1992 and 
2002 vs. 2003), thus enhancing our confidence in the series.  
The matched CPS/O*NET data set allows us to examine changes in caring in the labor market 
over the 28 year period from 1983 to 2010. Note that the within-occupation O*NET ratings are not 
changing (they are fixed at 2007 values). Thus, the measured economy-wide changes in caring occur 
entirely from changes in the distribution of workers across occupations (all index values are employment 
weighted using CPS sample weights). Figure 3 shows the trends for the years 1983-2010 in the mean 
levels of ‘assisting & caring for others’ and ‘concern for others’ among both women and men. As evident 
in the figure, the levels of these caring tasks in the U.S. labor market has increased steadily over time for 
both women and men, but the overall change has been quite small and there is no evidence of a 
narrowing in the caring gap between women and men.  
Similar descriptive data for 1983-2010 was also constructed for the four O*NET D/T attributes. 
In Figure 4, we show the means of each of these attributes for the years 1983 and 2010. In contrast to 
the evidence on caring, we find that the developing and teaching content of both women and men’s 
jobs have increased over time, but substantially more so for women than men. By 2010, women’s jobs 
involved slightly higher levels than did men’s jobs of training and teaching, coaching and developing, and 
instructing others, and slightly lower levels of developing and building teams.  
5. Measuring Wage Differentials for Caring Work: Methods 
Our empirical approach is straightforward. We estimate standard Mincerian semilog earnings 
functions in which hourly earnings is a function of accumulated human capital (net of depreciation), 
                                                          
20 We thank David Macpherson for providing programming code to convert 1990 and 2000 Census occupation 
codes back to 1980 codes. Note that the O*NET measures matched to 1980 COC codes are used exclusively for the 
historical series shown in Figures 3 and 4, but nowhere else in this paper. 
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proxied by time spent in schooling and the labor market. The human capital earnings function is 
augmented by inclusion of selected demographic controls, measures of location, and job attributes 
associated with wage differentials, including various measures of caring. We provide estimates from 
separate female and male earnings functions. This permits a straightforward way to examine how caring 
job attributes differently affect the wages of women and men, as emphasized in this literature. We 
provide estimates using panel as well as cross-section data, thus accounting for worker heterogeneity. 
And our large sample allows us to examine whether caring wage differentials differ across the private 
and public sectors, as well as among various worker characteristics.  
To examine caring wage differentials across workers, we use the CPS/O*NET 2006-2008 sample 
and estimate wage level equations of the following form:  
𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝐹 = ∑ (𝛽𝑘𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑘𝐹) + 𝛾𝐹𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝐹 + 𝜀𝑖𝐹
𝐾
𝑘=1     (1a) 
𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑀 = ∑ (𝛽𝑘𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑀) + 𝛾𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀 + 𝜀𝑖𝑀
𝐾
𝑘=1     (1b) 
Here, subscripts F and M denote female and male, respectively; 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖 is the natural log of hourly 
earnings for worker i;  𝑋𝑖𝑘  contains an intercept and K-1 independent variables measuring worker and 
job-related characteristics;  𝛽𝑘 contains a constant and coefficients for covariates in X;  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 is the 
covariate(s) of interest measuring caring skills for each worker’s detailed occupation; 𝛾 are the 
coefficients of interest measuring marginal wage effects of one standard deviation changes in the caring 
measures; and  𝜀𝑖  is an idiosyncratic error term. Estimates of 𝛾𝐹 and 𝛾𝑀may be sensitive to the controls 
included in 𝑋𝑘, in particular measures of job skills and working conditions. And variants of equations (1a) 
and (1b) can be estimated within different sectors or for different groups of workers. 
If employment in caring jobs is correlated with workers skills, motivation, etc. not reflected in 
measures of occupation skill requirements, wage level estimates may be biased. In order to account for 
worker heterogeneity, we use panel analysis, in this case longitudinal wage change equations that 
conform to the CPS sample structure. To examine wage differentials for caring among job switchers, we 
use our CPS/O*NET 2003/4–2008/9 panel sample, including only those workers who change 
occupations and, thus, have had changes in the O*NET caring measures.21 We estimate the following 
wage change equations: 
                                                          
21 More precisely, we include only those who have changed detailed occupation and industry in order to insure 
that we include mostly “true” job switchers. Worker descriptions of occupation are coded by Census employees 
and can be coded differently one year apart even when there has been no job change. Industry is reported with 
greater accuracy and restricting the sample to just those who report changes in occupation and industry insures a 
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∆𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝐹 = ∑ (𝛽𝑘𝐹∆𝑋𝑖𝑘𝐹) + 𝛾𝐹∆𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝐹 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝐹
𝐾
𝑘=1     (2a) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑀 = ∑ (𝛽𝑘𝑀∆𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑀) + 𝛾𝑀∆𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑀
𝐾
𝑘=1    (2b) 
where ∆ denotes changes between year-pairs (i.e., 2004 minus 2003, etc.). Parameter estimates in 
equations (2a) and (2b) are based exclusively on occupation switchers and net out worker-specific fixed 
effects on wages. Two limitations in using the O*NET job skill/task measures warrant mention: (1) the 
O*NET values matched to each occupation are fixed over time, and (2) the value of each O*NET 
attribute does not vary across workers in a given occupation.22 We are not concerned with the first issue 
– relative occupational differences in attributes change gradually and our analysis is for a relatively short 
time period. The measurement of job attributes at the occupation rather than individual worker level is 
a more serious concern. There is heterogeneity of job characteristics within detailed occupations and 
these may differ to some degree by gender as well as across individuals. It is not clear whether or to 
what extent measurement error in O*NET job attributes is mitigated in the panel analysis through 
differencing (i.e., where “two wrongs can make a right”). Because job attributes are at the occupation 
rather than individual level, we cluster standard errors by occupation in the wage level analysis and by 
occupation switching pairs in the longitudinal analysis.23 
An important advantage of our CPS/O*NET data set is that we not only have continuous 
measures of caring intensity across all occupations, but also measures for a large array of detailed job 
tasks, skill requirements, and working conditions. Such data make it more likely that we can obtain 
relatively clean estimates of wage differentials associated with caring in the U.S. labor market. And 
because the analysis also is done using CPS longitudinal data, where we identify person-specific wage 
changes resulting from movement across years into or out of occupations with different levels of caring, 
we can account for bias due to worker heterogeneity correlated with caring.  
We include additional independent variables to control for other important factors that may 
influence wages. When estimating wage level regression equations (1a and 1b), we use controls for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
high probability of true occupational change, thus avoiding attenuation of the caring coefficients. For a careful 
discussion of this approach, see Macpherson and Hirsch (1995).  
22 O*NET updates ratings for occupations on a rolling basis; it takes several years for all occupations to have 
revised ratings. 
23 Because there are such a large number of occupation-to-occupation combinations in the panel analysis, there 
are only trivial differences between non-clustered and clustered standard errors. An issue not addressed for the 
wage level analysis is that two observations exist for a sizable share of the workers, thus decreasing standard 
errors and slightly exaggerating significance levels. This is a standard issue when using full CPS samples for adjacent 
years. For those concerned, the typical approach is to cut the sample (roughly) in half using workers observed 
either in their first year (rotation group 4) or second year (rotation group 8). We know of no examples where 
results meaningfully differ between such samples. 
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potential experience (years since schooling completed or since age 16, whichever is less) in quartic form, 
dummies for gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, foreign-born, union, region (8 dummies for 9 
regions), city size (6), year, broad industry (11), and broad occupation (9). Education dummies are 
included for the completed grades 9, 10, 11, and 12 (but no diploma), plus high school degree (including 
the GED), some college no degree, associate, bachelor, masters, professional, and doctorate degrees 
(those reporting 0-8 years are the omitted category). Dummies are also included for the public sector 
and the private-not-for-profit sector (private-for-profit being the reference group). Given that caring 
jobs are sometimes largely female jobs, we separately estimate wage equations including a sex 
composition variable to control for the ratio of the number of females to total workers in each 
occupation. Although this is not the focus of our study, we can observe the sensitivity of caring penalty 
estimates to the inclusion of gender composition (and vice-versa).  
6. Caring Wage Differentials Using Wage Level Analysis 
Table 5 provides wage level results for women and men, respectively, with different columns 
(specifications) including alternative measures or combinations of caring. Column 1 includes the single 
‘caring’ index that loads the two O*NET descriptors measuring ‘assisting & caring’ and ‘concern’ for 
others. Column 2 includes the ‘developing/teaching’ index that loads the four relevant O*NET attributes; 
it excludes the caring index. Columns 3 includes both the ‘caring’ and ‘D/T’ factor indices. Column 4 
regressions include the six separate O*NET measures (each normalized to zero mean and standard 
deviation of one) included in the caring and D/T indices, but we focus on (and show) only the O*NET 
measures ‘assisting & caring’ and ‘concern’ for others (coefficients on the other four are included in 
appendix Table A-1). Coefficients on the O*NET factor indices in columns 1-3 and normalized O*NET 
descriptors in column 4 can be interpreted as the partial effect of a one standard deviation change in the 
caring measure.  
All specifications include a rich set of individual worker and location controls (see the text note) 
and, importantly, O*NET occupational skill and working condition indices. For reasons of space, we do 
not show coefficients for all our control variables. Tables in the appendix provide coefficients for most of 
the control variables not shown in Tables 5 and 7 (the wage level and wage change results, respectively). 
Table 6 is identical to Table 5, except that we omit the O*NET skill and working condition indices. Before 
turning to results with respect to the caring variables, we note that the skill (and to a lesser extent, 
working conditions) indices have large and highly significant coefficients and add 3-4 percentage points 
to the R2 values. A one s.d. increase in the skill index is associated with a roughly 20 log point increase in 
wages for women and men. These large wage effects reflect the impact not only from job skill 
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requirements but also from worker skills not fully captured by schooling, potential experience, and other 
CPS control variables. In our panel analysis (shown subsequently), which accounts for worker fixed 
effects, the skill index coefficients are only about one-fifth as large, but still highly significant. The 
estimated working conditions coefficients are positive, as predicted by theory, with larger coefficients 
(in cross-section analysis) for women than men, consistent with prior literature (Hersch 1998). 
Turning to the estimated effects of caring on wages in Table 5, we first focus on the estimated 
wage effects of the ‘caring’ index, absent control for the D/T index (column 1). For women, the estimate 
is a wage penalty of 0.04 log points, which is marginally significant. The coefficient for men is a more 
substantive and significant coefficient of -0.09, indicating a 9 percent lower wage with respect to a one 
s.d. increase in the level of caring. In column 2, we include the D/T but not caring index and in column 3 
we include both. The caring coefficients change relatively little with the addition of D/T. The coefficients 
on D/T are negative and significant for both women and men. Focusing on the individual caring 
measures in column 4, it is readily evident that for women and men, the ‘concern’ measure is more 
strongly associated with wage penalties than is the ‘assisting and caring’ measure.  Recall that the 
‘concern’ measure is intended to measure needed worker attributes, whereas the A&C measure reflects 
required work activities. A possible interpretation of these results is that the negative concern 
coefficient captures penalties resulting from labor supply preferences (i.e., the prisoner of love theory).  
Overall, the cross-section evidence in Table 5 provides support for the proposition that there are 
systematic nontrivial caring penalties in the labor market. It is important to note that the caring 
coefficient estimates are highly sensitive to inclusion of the skill index, consistent with the observation 
that high caring occupations include some of the highest (and lowest) skilled occupations in the labor 
market. Table 6 is identical to Table 5, except that each wage equation excludes the O*NET skill and 
working conditions indices. As evident in the Table 6 results, there is no longer clear evidence for caring 
wage penalties among women or men. Particularly notable is that the D/T coefficients turn from sharply 
negative to sharply positive once the job skills index is removed. As discussed subsequently, this change 
is due the exceptionally high skill requirement ratings attached to teaching occupations. A similar effect 
occurs with respect to the caring coefficients. Health professional occupations, nursing in particular, 
have high job skill requirements that we control for in Table 5 but not in Table 6. Similar effects no 
doubt are occurring to a lesser degree among numerous occupations, reinforcing the importance of 
controlling for occupational skill in the wage level analysis. Absent these controls, the only evidence we 
find for caring penalties is associated with the O*NET descriptor measuring workers’ need to have 
concern for others, its coefficients being similar with or without inclusion of the skill index.  
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Our takeaway points from Tables 5 and 6 are twofold. First, evidence for penalties associated 
with caring jobs is stronger for men than for women and is rather mixed with respect to the types of 
caring attached to jobs. Second, skills matter. Worker and job skills have high payoffs in the labor market 
but are not typically well accounted for (controlled) in standard analyses. Caring jobs sometimes require 
highly skilled workers and tasks (e.g., registered nurses) and sometimes not. Because of the importance 
of skill, we place greater emphasis on our longitudinal estimates (shown below), which control both for 
worker heterogeneity (worker-specific fixed skills) and changes in job skill requirements.  
7. Wage Equation Caring Results Using Longitudinal Analysis 
As in England et al. (2002), our preferred approach for estimating caring wage differentials is 
longitudinal analysis that accounts for worker heterogeneity fixed over time (i.e., consecutive years 
using the CPS). There are potential downsides to using longitudinal data and, more narrowly, to using a 
sample that identifies wage gaps exclusively on job switchers (in this application, workers changing both 
occupation and industry). One concern is whether or not caring wage gaps for the job switcher sample 
are representative of the larger labor force. A second concern is whether selection into job change (i.e., 
endogenous job change) biases the longitudinal estimates. We address these issues below.  
To examine the representativeness of the job switcher sample, we compare measurable worker 
characteristics for the two samples and estimate wage level equations for the job switcher sample 
identical to those shown in Table 5 (we show results using the initial year observation, but results are 
nearly identical using the second year). In comparing means of all variables for the two samples, we 
found no large or unusual differences (these results are available on request). The wage level regression 
results for the job switcher sample are shown in Appendix Table A-2. The results for the two samples are 
reasonably similar, although not identical. We see the same pattern of wage level caring penalties for 
both samples, the principal difference being that the caring penalties are somewhat higher for women 
and lower for men using the longitudinal rather than full samples. Indeed, the caring coefficients using 
the job switcher sample are quite similar for women and men, in contrast to those seen in Table 5. Our 
assessment is that the job switcher sample appears to be roughly representative, based both on similar 
measured characteristics and similar regression coefficients with comparable models. 
The results from the longitudinal wage change analysis, shown in Table 7, are reasonably clear-
cut. The magnitude of coefficients is substantially smaller using longitudinal rather than wage level 
analysis. Specifically, the coefficients on the ‘caring’ index (column 1 of Table 7) for women indicates a 
1.4 log point decrease for a one s.d. increase in the caring index, while the estimate for men shows a 1.8 
log point decrease. These coefficients are similar when the D/T index is included (column 3). Coefficients 
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on the D/T index are effectively zero for women and men. In column (4) we break out the caring index 
into its component parts, obtaining negative but small wage effects for both ‘caring & assisting’ and 
‘concern’ for others (the four D/T measures are also included, with coefficients shown in Appendix Table 
A-3). These caring estimates are tiny and not significant for women. They are somewhat more 
substantive for men, 1.1% and 0.8% wage decreases for one s.d. increases in ‘caring &assisting’ and 
‘concern’ for others, respectively.  
Overall, we regard the longitudinal evidence of wage penalties for caring work (measured by the 
narrow caring index) as plausible and reasonably convincing. That said, the magnitude of the estimated 
penalties is rather small, particularly so as compared to other wage gaps estimated in the larger 
literature (say, with respect to union status, city size, race/ethnicity, etc.).  
A second concern pertinent for the longitudinal analysis is whether selection into job change 
(i.e., endogenous job change) biases the panel estimates. Selection of course has a bearing on the wage 
level analysis as well, but there the presumption was that wage differentials observed for caring work 
are “market prices” determined for marginal workers. Infra-marginal workers in caring jobs have a 
relatively stronger preference for caring and would have accepted lower wages (a larger penalty) to 
work in caring jobs. Infra-marginal workers in non-caring jobs would not be willing to work in caring jobs 
at current wage levels. Longitudinal analysis based on occupation switchers is likely to reflect wage 
changes among workers who tend to be closer to the margin and less likely to be inframarginal, an 
advantage of such analysis. The concern regarding the panel approach, however, is that even among 
such a group, job change is endogenous rather than random and likely to be correlated with wage 
changes. In our panel analysis, endogenous selection is likely to bias caring coefficients in opposite 
directions (as explained below) depending on whether workers move to occupations with lower or 
higher levels of caring. Thus, separate estimates for workers who “up-care” and “down-care” provide a 
useful robustness check on our results.  
Workers are more likely to switch jobs the less attractive the wage in the current job relative to 
the wage in the destination job. This can affect measurement of the caring wage differential, as 
illustrated in Figure 5, which shows workers switching from job 1 with market wage W1 to job 2 with 
market wage W2. Job switchers who “down-care” (think of this as moving to a job disamenity or, 
equivalently, a loss in amenities) are more likely to do so if they have a relatively low wage draw on the 
current job (seen by the dotted line below market wage W1) or high wage draw on the destination job 
(seen by the dotted line above market wage W2). This leads to an upward bias in the caring wage gap 
seen among down-care movers in that the observed ∆W exceeds the market wage differential W2 – W1. 
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The same logic holds for “up-care” job switchers, who on average are more likely to have made the 
move if the wage on the lower-caring initial job was less than W1 and/or there is a low wage penalty 
associated with the higher-caring destination job (i.e. a wage above W2), thus leading to a downward 
bias in wage gaps seen between the low caring source job and high caring destination job. Imagine that 
the market equilibrium for a given difference in job caring is a 2% caring wage penalty. Our expectation 
is that estimates from those who “down-care” would exhibit average wage increases greater than 2%, 
while those who “up-care” will exhibit wage changes less than 2% in absolute value (i.e. wage decreases 
less than 2%). If we were to observe the predicted pattern with wide bounds around the average, it 
would suggest that such selection bias is substantive.  
As seen in Table 8, longitudinal wage change equations providing separate estimates for those 
who up-care and down-care display fairly tight bounds, with similar coefficients for those who up-care 
and down-care (in no case are coefficients significantly different). For men, the separate coefficient 
estimates for “Up∙∆Care” and “Down∙∆Care” generally produce lower caring wage gap estimates (in 
absolute value) for workers who up-care and higher estimates for those who down-care, as expected 
based on selection. This pattern is not generally evident among women, suggesting any bias from 
selection is small, being more than offset by sample differences in wage changes among the “up” and 
“down” groups. The important point is that in all cases, coefficient differences between those moving 
toward more- and less-caring occupations are small, providing relatively tight bounds on our results. As 
an example, recall that in Table 7, column 3, we found statistically significant penalties of -0.014 for 
women and -0.022 for men. Estimating separate “up” and “down” care wage changes in column 3 of 
Table 8, we obtain estimates for men of -0.0135 and -0.030, symmetrically bounding the earlier -0.022 
estimate and supporting the expected pattern of selection into job change. For women, we obtained 
“up” and “down” estimates of -0.017 and -0.011, which provides narrow bounds on the joint -0.014 
estimate, but do not show the expected pattern of selection.24  
8. Caring Penalties in the Public versus Private Sectors  
Authors emphasizing the importance of caring wage penalties have stressed not only its 
disproportionate impact on women, but also that it may reflect a concentration of caring jobs in the 
public sector (e.g., Barron and West 2013). If caring jobs are concentrated in the public sector, a caring 
                                                          
24 For both women and men and for all measures of caring, there were roughly equal numbers of workers “up-
caring” and “down-caring” but with the number in the former group slightly exceeding that in the latter, consistent 
with the gradual upward trend in caring over time (see Figure 3). For both female and male job switchers, mean 
changes in caring magnitudes are nearly identical (in absolute value) for “up” versus “down” changes. For women, 
mean changes in the caring and developing/teaching indices are 0.67 and 0.86 standard deviations. For men, the 
equivalent means are 0.59 and 0.79.  
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penalty would mechanically arise if public workers are systematically paid less than are similar private 
sector workers in similarly demanding jobs. Analysis of public-private pay differences is beyond the 
scope of our paper, but our assessment of a now extensive literature is that estimated public/private 
wage differentials are typically small, sometimes negative and sometimes positive, and somewhat 
sensitive to inclusion of what have become controversial control variables (e.g., union status and 
employer size). More clear-cut is the finding of considerably greater pay compression and relatively 
higher non-wage benefits (pensions, health insurance) in the public sector.25 Although not the focus of 
our study, in our regression analyses, a public sector dummy variable is systematically positive for 
women and men in the wage level analyses and effectively zero in the wage change analyses (shown in 
the Appendix Tables A-1 and A-3). 
We do not focus on public/private pay differences, but instead examine how wages vary with 
respect to caring measures within the public and private sectors. Our principal focus is on results from 
wage level analyses for the two sectors. We do not examine wage changes among those switching 
occupations within the public sector because of measurement issues (discussed below). In addition to 
distinguishing between the public and private sectors, caring wage effects can differ across the private 
for-profit and private not-for-profit sectors, the latter including numerous health care workers 
employed by not-for-profit hospitals, as well as other caring workers employed by non-profits other 
than hospitals. As noted by a referee, public programs (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid) also can influence 
wage levels in the private sector. To preview our results, we find evidence consistent with caring 
penalties being more likely in the public than in the private sector, and (seen subsequently in section 10) 
with similar wages for caring work in the private for-profit and not-for-profit sectors. 
Prior to turning to the wage evidence, we first examine the extent to which caring work is more 
prevalent in the public than in the private sector based on our multiple O*NET measures of caring. 
Figure 6 (as well as Table 9) shows the relative values for the six O*NET attribute measures. There is 
clear-cut evidence that for women and men, jobs in the public sector require considerably higher levels 
of caring, defined broadly or narrowly. Focusing on the O*NET factor indices (with mean 0 and s.d. 1 
over the entire male/female, private/public sample), each is higher for women than men within the 
public sector, and each is higher in the public than in the private sector for women and for men. For 
example, the caring index for women in the public sector is 0.60 versus 0.21 in the private sector; for 
men, the public and private values are 0.22 and -0.35. For the D/T factor index, the value for women in 
                                                          
25 Recent studies include Gittleman and Pierce (2011), Bender and Heywood (2012), and Lewin et al. (2012). The 
debate regarding inclusion of a union control can be traced back to Linneman and Wachter (1990). 
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the public sector is 0.62 versus -0.08 in the private sector; for men, the public and private values are 
0.54 and -0.03. And as widely recognized, women are disproportionately employed in public sector jobs. 
The share of women in our public sector sample is 58.5%, as compared to 47.6% in the private sector. 
Using all CPS wage and salary workers for 2007 (i.e., no sample exclusions) and employing sample 
weights, the shares of women in the public and private sectors are 57% and 46%, respectively.26 
Turning to the wage level results (Table 10), we provide separate estimates for caring wage 
penalties within the private and public sectors. In the private sector, results are similar to those seen 
previously in Table 5 for the full sample, where roughly five out of six workers are in the private sector. 
As before, evidence for caring penalties among women is weak; that for men is more clear-cut.  
For the public sector (second page of Table 10), estimates for women and men suggest 
substantive caring penalties. Among women, a 5.7% penalty (column 3) is associated with a one s.d. 
change in the caring index. Among men, a 9.2% penalty (column 3) is found. For women and men, caring 
penalties in the public sector appear to be driven by jobs requiring ‘concern’ and not ‘assisting & caring’ 
for others (column 4). As noted previously, the ‘concern’ variable is intended to measure needed worker 
attributes, whereas the ‘assisting and caring’ variable measures job activities.  
Notable in Table 10 are also the significantly negative coefficients attached to the D/T index, a 
result highly influenced by the large number of teachers in the sample. Our assessment is that these 
apparent penalties are overstated due to exceptionally high O*NET skill requirement ratings assigned to 
teaching occupations.27  
Our wage level analysis in this section supports the thesis of larger caring penalties in the public 
than in the private sector. Because of unobserved worker heterogeneity, we have attached greater 
                                                          
26 Men are slightly underrepresented in our estimation samples because they have higher rates of earnings non-
response. As discussed previously, non-respondents are not matched to donors based either on public/private 
status or detailed occupation; their inclusion would attenuate estimated wage gaps (Bollinger and Hirsch 2006). 
27 The issue here is the impact of our occupational skills index. Note how the D/T index coefficients for our full 
sample turn from negative to positive when the skill index is excluded (Tables 5 versus 6). O*NET ratings of the 
skills involved in teaching are extremely high. Given the large market rewards associated with the job skill index, 
one finds that teachers are underpaid in the sense that their hourly earnings fall below the predicted wage. O*NET 
skill measures reflect the skills and tasks needed to perform a job well. They do not necessarily provide an accurate 
measure of the skills of workers hired in these jobs, although competitive market forces should limit discrepancies 
between worker skills and job skill ratings. It is quite possible that O*NET skill ratings for teaching jobs overstate 
the skill level of the average teacher. Thus, wage analyses controlling for job skill requirements understates relative 
pay for teachers. For example, Allegretto et al. (2004) use the CPS to compare hourly earnings for teachers with 
non-teachers, controlling for CPS worker attributes plus an occupational work level index derived from BLS data, 
similar in spirit to our O*NET skill index. Teachers were rated very high in required job skills and the authors 
concluded that teachers are substantially underpaid. Other analyses in the literature (e.g., Podgursky, Monroe, and 
Watson 2004; Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner 2006) fail to support the thesis of teacher underpayment, finding 
that those who leave teaching suffer substantive wage losses. 
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weight to the longitudinal than to the cross-section results. Economy-wide, the longitudinal evidence 
suggests much lower caring wage penalties than seen in the wage level analysis (Tables 5 and 7), 
indicating that worker heterogeneity is important. It is not obvious how to conduct meaningful 
longitudinal analysis within the public sector, however, because turnover is low and there are relatively 
few teachers, police, and firefighters (among others) switching both occupation and industry within the 
public sector. Were we to base such an analysis on changes in recorded occupation codes (but not 
require an industry change), the ratio of noise (i.e., reporting error) to true signal would be high and 
estimates would be severely attenuated.  
9. Caring Penalties across the Earnings Distribution 
Prior studies on caring wage differentials have focused on particular occupations, some 
requiring relatively low and some high skills. We examine how caring wage differentials vary across the 
earnings distribution using two approaches. First, we provide estimates using quantile regression, which 
provide caring coefficient estimates that vary across the wage distribution. Second, we divide our 
sample into quintiles based on their predicted earnings using only non-job attributes (schooling, 
demographics, location, etc.), which provides an index of earnings attributes or endowments, each 
weighted by its importance (coefficient) in the earnings function. We then provide OLS estimates within 
each of the quintiles. This latter approach can be used for our wage change analysis, where quantile 
regression is not appropriate.28  
In Table 11, we show quantile regression results for women and men that correspond exactly to 
columns (1) through (3) shown previously in Table 5. These regressions include our full set of covariates, 
plus the caring index alone, the D/T index alone, and both the caring and D/T indices. We show our 
previous OLS results in the first column, followed by the quantile regression coefficients for percentiles 
10, 25, 50, 75, and 90. The OLS results include clustered standard errors, while unclustered standard 
errors are provided for the quantile regression results. Given that standard errors in the quantile 
regression model should be less precise than with OLS, our guesstimate is that quantile regression 
coefficients need to exceed (in absolute value) roughly 0.05 to be significant at the standard 0.05 level.  
The pattern of results in Table 11 is reasonably clear-cut. For women, the caring coefficients are 
remarkably stable across the wage distribution. The coefficient on the caring index (specification 1) 
indicates penalties of 0.05, 0.05, 0.04, 0.04, and 0.05 log points as one moves from the 10th to the 90th 
                                                          
28 Quantile regression has been used in numerous applications. For examples and further details see Buchinsky 
(1998) and Koencker (2005). For an example of OLS log wage and wage change regressions for worker groups 
ordered by predicted wages, see Card (1996).  
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percentiles. Among men, there is the suggestion that penalties are somewhat higher in the bottom half 
the distribution, with caring penalties of 0.12, 0.11, 0.10, 0.07, and 0.05 log points as one move up the 
distribution. For all specifications, the median regression results are similar to the OLS mean regression 
seen previously in Table 5. In short, the quantile regression analysis for women suggests little difference 
in the wage-caring gradient across the distribution, while that for men suggests smaller penalties toward 
the top of the wage distribution. Although our principal focus is the wage effect of caring rather than of 
developing/teaching tasks in the labor market, the D/T coefficients are remarkably stable throughout 
the earnings distribution.  
In Table 12, we provide a distributional analysis of wage-caring gradients using both wage level 
and wage change analysis. Longitudinal (wage change) analysis does not lend itself to quantile 
regression; we are not asking how caring coefficients differ across the distribution of wage changes (i.e., 
the dependent variable). It is informative, however, to estimate OLS wage change (and wage level) 
equations within predicted wage percentile ranges, as seen in Card (1996). Here, we estimates OLS wage 
equations for each of the five quintiles of the predicted log wage, based on non-job attributes. The 
predicted wage provides a convenient index of compensable worker endowments and location wage 
differences. In the top half of Table 12, we show wage level results for women and men; in the bottom 
half we show wage change results. 
The wage level results shown in the top half of Table 12 are roughly supportive of the pattern 
found using quantile regression, with OLS results at the middle quintile being very similar to median 
regression results. As with the quantile regression, we do not see systematic patterns of either 
increasing or decreasing caring wage penalties as we move across the distribution.  
Our principal interest is the bottom half of Table 12, which provides OLS wage change results 
estimated separately by endowment quintiles; the results from the full sample, as shown previously in 
Table 7, are shown in the first column. For women, coefficient estimates on the caring index are 
negative and surprisingly similar in the lowest and highest quintiles (-0.015 and -0.017), while 
coefficients in the middle quintile are near zero. The caring coefficients for men are -0.016 and -0.024 in 
the lowest and highest quintiles, with near zero in the middle quintile. Because caring jobs are often 
concentrated among high and low skill workers, there may be too little variation in caring in the middle 
of the distribution to precisely estimate the wage-caring gradient.  
We did not have strong priors that caring wage penalties should be systematically larger or 
smaller at different parts of the earnings and skill distributions. The quantile regression and wage 
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quintile analyses presented in this section provide little evidence for either an upward- or downward-
sloping wage-caring gradient over these distributions.  
10. Linearity, Hours Worked, and Group Differences in Caring Wage Effects  
In this section we address three issues. We first examine whether our (implicit) assumption of a 
linear relationship between wages and the level of caring is reasonable. Second, we ask how weekly 
hours worked for women and men vary with respect to levels of caring. And third, we examine whether 
there exist substantive group differences in the relationship between wages and caring.  
In order to examine the linearity of the wage-caring gradient, we first extract the residuals from 
our female and male log wage regressions (specifically, column 3 from Table 5). We provide a scatterplot 
of these residuals with respect to the caring index that loads the O*NET measures ‘assisting & caring’ 
and ‘concern’ for others. By construction the regression residuals have mean zero. If the wage-caring 
relationship is truly linear, then the plot of mean residuals at each level of caring (in effect, the means 
for each of 501 occupations ordered by caring level), should be relatively flat at near-zero values. Figure 
7 shows this relationship for women and men. The smoothed scatterplots are fitted from locally 
weighted regressions using the “lowess” command in Stata (Cleveland 1979). 
What is readily evident for both women and men is that there is little slope over most of the 
distribution and minimal deviation from zero. Absence of substantial deviation from linearity provides 
support for our using simple and convenient linear specifications. That said, the figures are informative. 
The notable deviation from linearity is with respect to very high caring jobs (heavily dominated by health 
care jobs), with the upward slope more evident for women than men. The high-caring jobs are 
dominated by health care, all occupations with a caring index level above 2.0 being in health care, and 
those between 1.5 and 2.0 being mostly in health care. All else the same, workers in health care 
occupations are paid more than those outside the health sector. While there exist caring wage penalties 
in some sectors of the labor market, we find little evidence for such penalties in healthcare, the sector of 
the economy where jobs are evaluated as requiring the highest levels of assisting/caring and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, concern for others. 
Next we examine how hours worked vary with respect to caring work. Throughout the paper, 
we examine how average hourly earnings (i.e., wages) differ with respect to caring. If high-caring jobs 
had substantially higher (lower) weekly hours of work than did low-caring jobs, a substantive caring 
wage penalty would be associated with even larger (smaller) differences in weekly earnings. To examine 
the hours-caring relationship, Figure 8 provides a smoothed scatterplot (using the lowess procedure) 
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showing the relationship between usual weekly hours and our O*NET caring index for women and men. 
Mean hours worked per week are 37.2 hours for women and 42.2 for men (Table 2). As seen in Figure 8, 
in some of the lowest-caring occupations mean weekly hours are close to 40 for women, but then 
decline with respect to caring over the lower and mid-caring portions of the distribution, remaining 
roughly constant at well under 40 hours per week in high-caring occupations. In contrast, men’s average 
hours worked are relatively flat over the lower half of the caring distribution, but then turn up and are 
highest among those working in occupations with the highest levels of caring. Recall that health care 
occupations dominate the right tail of the caring distribution. Women are overrepresented in health 
care occupations where part-time work or low full-time hours are common; men are highly represented 
in health care occupations where long work hours are common.  
Up to this point, we have estimated the wage-caring relationship separately for women and 
men, but have not examined differences across other groups of workers. Although such differences are 
not a focus of the paper, in Table 13 we provide caring level means and wage regression coefficients for 
selected demographic and worker groups. The caring coefficient for each group is from a wage level 
regression equivalent to that in column 3 of table 5.29 Among both women and men, higher levels of 
caring are seen for part-time than full-time workers, for salaried versus hourly workers, for non-
Hispanics than for Hispanics, for citizens than for non-citizens, among prime-age and older workers than 
among young workers, in the private not-for-profit and public sectors versus the private for-profit 
sector, and, most notably, among those with higher education levels.  
Estimates of caring wage penalties (i.e., coefficients on the caring index) differ across groups, 
but often by little. Consistent with previous evidence for women, caring coefficients for most female 
groups are generally negative, but small and often insignificant. In contrast, all caring coefficients for 
men are negative, with most being statistically significant and substantive. Among the patterns observed 
are a tendency for more sizable caring penalties for full-time than for part-time work, increasing caring 
penalties with age, particularly large penalties for high school graduates and little evidence for penalties 
among those with graduate and professional degrees, and, as reported previously, more substantive 
penalties in the public than private sector, but with little difference between the private for-profit and 
not-for-profit sectors. Few differences are found with respect to race, ethnicity, foreign-born status, or 
marital status. The positive caring coefficients among women for part-time and private not-for-profit are 
driven primarily by the high wages seen for registered nurses. There is little if any part-time penalty 
                                                          
29 This specification includes both the caring index and the developing/teaching (D/T) index. The choice of 
regressors is slightly modified as appropriate for each group. For example, the part-time dummy is excluded when 
we provide separate estimates for full- and part-time workers.  
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among RNs. Moreover, RNs employed in hospitals earn substantially more than do other RNs 
(Schumacher and Hirsch 1997) and about a third of hospital employees (using the 2008 CPS) work for 
private not-for-profit firms (Hirsch and Macpherson 2014, Table 7b, p. 97). More broadly, with RNs 
removed from all the analyses in this paper, one systematically finds more substantial evidence for 
caring wage penalties among women. 
Previous literature has included dummy variables for selected occupations deemed as caring 
occupations. In practice, this approach leads to designating as caring jobs those who work as teachers, in 
health care occupations, and in child care and other caring occupations. Our concern about such an 
approach is twofold. First, such an approach fails to make distinctions between the level of caring 
required among occupations designated as caring and among those not designated as caring. Second, 
occupations designated as caring, say registered nurses and teachers, may require different types of 
caring and entail different types of job tasks. A virtue of our approach is that we use multiple measures 
– assisting and caring, concern for others, and developing/teaching tasks – each measured as continuous 
variables for all occupations. Such an approach allows one to distinguish between types of caring, to 
measure required levels of each task for all jobs, and to differentiate how these tasks are compensated 
in the labor market, conditional on other wage determinants.  
We examine results using the dummy variable approach. Using wage level analysis and a single 
dummy variable for caring jobs (including health, teaching, and other caring occupations), we obtain 
negative and significant coefficients for women (-0.11) and men (-0.26). These results mask what are 
large positive and negative coefficients found when we break up the caring jobs into medical (2 
categories), education (3), and other caring (2). For both women and men, we find large positive 
coefficients for the health care occupation dummies and large negative coefficients for the education 
and other caring dummies. When we shift to longitudinal analysis (similar to that in England et al. 2002), 
coefficients on the caring dummy change variable are virtually zero (-.0006 for women and -.0095 for 
men), neither being close to statistical significance. These results reinforce our earlier conclusion that 
accounting for individual worker heterogeneity is important.  
11. Caring Penalties, Occupational Gender Composition, and the Gender Wage Gap  
It is widely recognized that both women and men who work in occupations with high 
proportions of female workers tend to have lower wages (for comprehensive treatments, see 
Macpherson and Hirsch [1995], Bayard et al. [2003], and Ludsteck [2014]). Less clear are the reasons for 
these relationships, with it being some combination of sex-based discrimination, differences in job skill 
requirements and working conditions, unmeasured worker attributes correlated with the percent 
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female (e.g., cumulative work experience), and difference in women’s and men’s occupational labor 
supply preferences. Because the sex composition of an occupation is highly correlated with occupational 
measures of caring (see Table 4), an important question to address is how addition of a sex composition 
variable (the %Female) to wage regressions affect the coefficients on the caring variables (and vice-
versa). England et al. (2002) included %Female in their preferred specification. Given that it is negatively 
correlated with wages and positively correlated with caring work, they found that exclusion of %Female 
(as in our analysis) led to somewhat larger caring penalty estimates.  
In order to save space, we summarize but do not report our results including %Female (they are 
available on request). Perhaps surprisingly, neither the cross-section nor longitudinal results are highly 
sensitive to inclusion of %Female in the wage equations. As expected, the wage level and wage change 
values of the caring coefficients become less negative after adding %Female, but the differences are 
modest and do not greatly change the interpretation of results. For example, in Table 5, the coefficients 
on the caring index for women and men (column 1) are -0.043 and -0.089; these decline (in absolute 
value) to -0.034 and -0.065 when %Female is added.  
We also examine the reverse question. Do the estimated effects of %Female simply reflect wage 
differences associated with caring job attributes? Here we find that adding the caring attributes to wage 
level equations that include %Female does substantively decrease (in absolute value) the %Female 
coefficients, typically by about a third. As in Macpherson and Hirsch (1995), we find that %Female has a 
larger negative wage relationship for men than for women in wage level analysis, but that the 
magnitudes of the %Female coefficients drop sharply in longitudinal wage equations, being relatively 
small and similar for women and men. The longitudinal results indicate that a substantive portion of the 
wage effects associated with %Female stems for unobserved worker differences correlated with gender 
(e.g., cumulative work hours and experience). In a recent study, Ludsteck (2014) draws a similar 
conclusion using German administrative data that contain establishment as well as worker fixed effects. 
In the larger academic and public discussion of gender wage differences, caring wage penalties 
are often proffered as an important (if not fundamental) determinant of the gender wage gap. Given the 
larger differences in levels of caring among jobs for women and men, such a focus would be appropriate 
if caring wage penalties were substantial (even more so if penalties were larger for women than men). 
That said, evidence in our paper indicates rather limited evidence for substantial market-wide caring 
penalties. Substantive estimates are found using wage level but not wage change analysis, yet the latter 
provides what are arguably more reliable results. The caring penalties that we do find are typically larger 
for men than for women.  
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How much might caring penalties narrow the gender wage gap? The difference in female and 
male means of the O*NET caring index is 0.56 (see Table 2). For sake of argument, assume that there 
exists a -0.02 wage penalty for a one standard deviation in caring. This roughly corresponds to the 
longitudinal estimates shown in Table 7 (column 3) showing caring coefficients of -0.014 for women and 
-0.022 for men. Multiplying 0.02 times the 0.56 caring difference indicates that the 0.190 gender wage 
gap in our sample (see Table 2) would be 0.011 or one log point lower absent the caring penalty, all else 
the same. Such a narrowing of the gender gap is not large. If one believes caring wage penalties are 
much larger, say, -0.05 rather than -0.02, the reduction in the gender gap would be less than 0.03 log 
points (0.05 times 0.56 = 0.028). Even if caring penalties were this large, policy implications are far from 
clear. What policies and shifts in attitudes might move us toward an alternative world in which we could 
eliminate caring wage differentials and/or differences in caring levels between women’s and men’s 
jobs? Are there not more feasible strategies through which gender equity can be enhanced and wage 
gaps narrowed? 
12. Conclusion 
Economists and sociologists have proposed plausible theories for why there may exist wage 
penalties for work involving helping and caring for others, jobs often performed by women. Previous 
evidence is mixed, but some studies have suggested wage penalties for women and men in caring jobs, 
on the order of 5%. Taken as a whole, the empirical evidence for caring wage penalties has been limited, 
varied, and not always convincing. Our expectation was that the use of large household samples of 
workers matched to multiple and varied measures of occupational “caring” would be likely to produce 
clear-cut and more compelling evidence of wage differentials associated with caring work.  
Rather than designating occupations as caring or not, we use continuous measures from O*NET 
of ‘assisting & caring for others’ and ‘concern for others’, plus four measures of ‘developing/teaching’, in 
order to construct alternative measures of caring in the labor market. Our principal results focus on a 
caring factor index that loads the ‘assisting & caring’ and ‘concern’ for others variables. We also 
construct broad-based measures of job skills/tasks and physical working conditions. All these job 
descriptors are based on evaluations from job analysts and incumbents for detailed occupations across 
the U.S. workplace. We match these job descriptors to multiple years of the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) earnings files, which enables us to perform both standard cross-section wage level and 
longitudinal wage change analyses, the latter based on large panels with two observations per worker 
(one year apart). Because longitudinal analysis identifies the effects of caring based on wage changes 
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among workers moving into and out of occupations involving different levels of caring, it accounts for 
otherwise unobserved worker heterogeneity correlated with wages.  
Although we do find evidence of wage penalties for caring work, the magnitudes of the 
penalties are modest or small. Using wage level analysis, we obtain estimates of caring wage penalties of 
roughly 4 percent for women and 8 percent for men resulting from a one standard deviation change in 
the caring index (these estimates would be zero for women and about 5 percent for men absent 
inclusion of our occupational skill index). For both women and men, the caring penalty is more strongly 
associated with a measure of ‘concern for others’ than with the measure ‘assisting and caring for 
others’. The former is intended to reflect needed worker attributes, whereas the latter reflects general 
work activities in the occupation. Our preferred estimates come from our longitudinal analysis (as in 
England et al. 2002), which accounts for worker heterogeneity. These estimates suggest caring penalties 
of 1.4 percent for women and 2 percent for men from a one standard deviation change in caring, with 
the ‘concern’ and ‘assisting and caring’ for others measures contributing similarly. 
Jobs in the public sector involve substantially higher levels of caring for both women and men. 
When we provide separate wage level analyses for the public and private sectors, we find stronger 
evidence for caring penalties in the public than in the private sector for both women and men. That said, 
fewer than 1-in-6 wage and salary employees work in the public sector, although the rate is larger 
among women than men. We were unable to provide longitudinal analysis for the public sector given 
that occupation changes within the public sector are infrequent and would be poorly measured. Our 
expectation is that a substantive portion of the caring penalty estimates found in the public sector 
would reflect worker heterogeneity, just as we found for the economy-wide sample. 
Also examined is how caring wage differentials vary across the earnings distribution. We do so 
using quantile regression and estimating OLS wage level and change equations across the quintiles of 
the predicted wage distribution. Although there are some differences in results between women and 
men based on the approach, the principal finding from the analysis is that caring wage effects are 
reasonably constant across the distribution.  
There is a widespread belief among social scientists and the public that women are 
disproportionately employed in caring jobs and are penalized for doing so, receiving lower wages than 
they or similarly skilled workers would receive in jobs not requiring care. Our study confirms that the 
levels of ‘assisting and caring’ and ‘concern’ for others in the workplace are substantially higher for 
women than men. Estimates of caring wage penalties are sensitive to methods and specification, an 
expected result given that caring jobs include some of the most highly skilled and least skilled jobs in the 
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economy. Although we find clear-cut evidence for lower wages in caring jobs using wage level analysis, 
the magnitude of these differences is sharply reduced using longitudinal analysis that accounts for 
worker heterogeneity. Our preferred estimates suggest caring wage penalties of about 2% for a one 
standard deviation increase in our caring index. Penalties are typically larger for men than for women, 
but fewer men work in high-caring jobs. We find little evidence for systematic differences in caring 
penalties across the wage distribution. The magnitude of estimated caring wage penalties is small as 
compared to other wage gaps in the labor market (e.g., union, industry, employer size, and city size 
wage differentials). Even were caring penalties erased from the labor market, there would be minimal 
closing of the gender wage gap.
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Figure 1 
 
W1 represents the reservation wage for workers who prefer caring jobs and W2 the 
reservation wage for those without such a preference. At low labor demand level D1 the 
equilibrium wage for the caring job is W1 with employment L1. At the high level D2 the 
equilibrium wage for both sets of workers is W2 with employment L2. 
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Figure 2.  Density Plots of O*NET ‘Caring’ and ‘Developing/Teaching’ Factor Indices 
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Figure 3. Trends in Means of O*NET ‘Caring’ Variables by Gender, 1983–2010 
 
‘A&C’ and ‘Concern’ denote O*NET caring attributes ‘assisting & caring for others’ and ‘concern for others’ measured in levels and scaled [0,1]. Weighted 
means are calculated using all wage & salary workers, ages 16+. Caring measures are from the 2007 O*NET version 12, matched to the 2006-2008 CPS using 
2000 COC codes, recalculated for that sample using 1980 COC codes, and then matched to workers for 1983-2010 using probabilistic time-consistent 1980 COC 
codes. The O*NET values by occupation are fixed. Changes over time are determined by changes in occupational employment. The ‘A&C’ and ‘Concern’ 
measures linked to 1980 COC codes are used in Figures 3 and 4, but nowhere else in the paper. See text for details.
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
M
ea
n
A&C - All A&C - Men A&C - Women Concern - All Concern - Men Concern - Women
36 
 
Figure 4. Means of Developing/Teaching O*NET Variables, by Sex for 1983 and 2010  
 
Weighted means are calculated using the full CPS sample for each year excluding only workers under age 16.  CPS 
data are matched based on 1980 Census occupation codes and 2007 O*NET (version 12.0) values. O*NET variables 
are measured in levels and scaled on [0,1]. See text for further discussion. 
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Figure 5.  Bounds for Selection Bias in Estimates of a Wage Penalty for Care Work 
 
W1 and W2 are mean market wages for low- and high-caring jobs. The arrows 
designate the range of wage changes most likely seen among job switchers, and ∆W 
represents the mean of observed wage changes among the movers. Selection should 
lead to smaller observed wage changes (in absolute value) among those who “up-
care” than among those who “down-care”. 
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Figure 6. O*NET Ratings of Caring Attributes by Gender and Public/Private Sectors 
 
Figures reflect the means shown in Table 9, which are based on the CPS/O*NET 2006-2008 sample. The %Female for 
public is 58.5% and for private 47.6% in our 2006-2008 sample. 
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Table 1. O*NET Job Level Attributes Describing Care Work 
 O*NET 
attribute 
label 
 
O*NET attribute description 
 
O*NET 
variable 
Possible 
score 
range 
C
ar
in
g 
 
Assisting and 
caring for 
others 
Providing personal assistance, medical attention, 
emotional support, or other personal care to others 
such as coworkers, customers, or patients 
4.a.4.a.5 [0, 7] 
Concern for 
others 
Job requires being sensitive to others' needs and 
feelings and being understanding and helpful on the 
job 
1.c.3.b [1, 5] 
D
ev
el
o
p
/T
ea
ch
 
Developing 
and building 
teams 
Encouraging and building mutual trust, respect, and 
cooperation among team members 
4.a.4.b.2 [0, 7] 
Training and 
teaching 
others 
Identifying the educational needs of others, 
developing formal educational or training programs or 
classes, and teaching or instructing others 
4.a.4.b.3 [0, 7] 
Coaching and 
developing 
others 
Identifying the developmental needs of others and 
coaching, mentoring, or otherwise helping others to 
improve their knowledge or skills 
4.a.4.b.5 [0, 7] 
Instructing Teaching others how to do something 2.b.1.e [0, 7] 
Source:  Author created using information from http://www.onetonline.org/. Original score range refers to the 
minimum and maximum score values in our sample before rescaling all O*NET attributes on [0, 1] using the formula  
𝑆 = (
𝑂−𝐿
𝐻−𝐿
), where O is the original rating score on the rating scale used, H is the highest possible score on the rating 
scale used, and L is the lowest possible score on the rating scale used. The caring variables are normalized to mean 
zero and s.d. equal 1 when included in wage regressions (column 4 of the regression tables) so coefficients can 
measure the log wage effect of a one s.d. change in the O*NET measure.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for CPS and O*Net Attributes, by Gender, 2006-2008 
 Women Men  
?̅?𝑭 − ?̅?𝑴 Variables mean s.d. mean s.d. 
Hourly earnings 18.83 13.51 23.21 17.59 -4.38 
Ln(hourly earnings) 2.7635 0.5602 2.9531 0.5931 -0.1896 
Usual hours worked per week 37.2 9.7 42.2 9.3 -5.0 
Individual O*NET attributes (scaled 0-1):      
   Concern for others 0.7793 0.1124 0.6916 0.1102 0.0877 
   Assisting & caring for others 0.4576 0.1625 0.3869 0.1281 0.0707 
   Developing & building teams 0.3681 0.1321 0.3854 0.1281 -0.0173 
   Training & teaching others 0.4269 0.1358 0.4249 0.1219 0.0020 
   Coaching & developing others 0.4331 0.1510 0.4274 0.1450 0.0057 
   Instructing 0.5822 0.1252 0.5633 0.1088 0.0189 
O*NET Indices (using factor analysis):      
   Caring index (loads concern and asst/caring above) 0.2950 0.8748 -0.2622 0.7420 0.5572 
   Developing/Teaching index (loads other 4 attributes) 0.0722 1.0062 0.0540 0.9201 0.0182 
   Job skills index (loads 162 O*NET attributes) 0.1157 0.9632 0.0332 1.0161 0.0825 
   Working conditions index (loads 38 O*NET attributes) -0.4124 0.6790 0.3554 1.1155 -0.7678 
Sex composition (%Female, from CPS) 0.6761 0.2332 0.3074 0.2468 0.3687 
N 166,009 168,760  
Variable means and s.d. created from the CPS are unweighted (weighted means are highly similar). Hourly earnings are 
measured using implicit hourly wage (usual weekly earnings/usual weekly hours worked). All indices formed from factor 
analysis are compiled using the combined female and male sample and, by construction, have mean 0 and s.d. 1.0. The 
job skills index loads 162 O*NET job attributes and does not include the 6 O*NET ‘caring’ attributes. See the text for 
further details.  
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Table 3. Measures of Caring for Occupations with High or Low Caring Ratings  
and Selected Large Occupations 
 
COC 
Occupation Name 
 (Standard Occupational Classification) 
A&C 
rank 
A&C 
value 
Concern 
rank 
Concern 
value 
3110 Physician assistants 1 0.961 2 0.983 
3060 Physicians and surgeons 2 0.961 12 0.945 
3500 Licensed practical nurses & licensed vocational nurses 3 0.886 6 0.970 
3220 Respiratory therapists 4 0.886 22 0.923 
3130 Registered nurses 5 0.876 13 0.943 
9110 Ambulance drivers & attendants, exc. emergency med. tech.  8 0.823 71 0.835 
2040 Clergy 12 0.799 103 0.800 
3160 Physical therapists 15 0.781 4 0.978 
3850 Police and sheriff's patrol officers 18 0.771 75 0.831 
3640 Dental assistants 22 0.743 73 0.833 
3630 Massage therapists 36 0.679 7 0.965 
2010 Social workers 40 0.666 25 0.921 
3650 Medical assistants and other healthcare support occupations 45 0.644 60 0.859 
4600 Child care workers 46 0.642 34 0.898 
2310 Elementary and middle school teachers 73 0.571 19 0.931 
3600 Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides 79 0.554 54 0.865 
620 Human resources, training, and labor relations specialists 104 0.525 59 0.860 
2200 Postsecondary teachers 115 0.500 121 0.783 
5700 Secretaries and administrative assistants 153 0.433 116 0.790 
4110 Waiters and waitresses 165 0.420 101 0.745 
5240 Customer service representatives 190 0.403 117 0.785 
4720 Cashiers 195 0.401 152 0.754 
1340 Biomedical engineers 202 0.393 272 0.670 
120 Financial managers 253 0.366 301 0.651 
9130 Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 266 0.359 341 0.623 
9620 Laborers and freight, stock, and material movers, hand 270 0.356 402 0.583 
10 Chief executives 293 0.346 176 0.738 
5620 Stock clerks and order fillers 299 0.343 265 0.673 
4760 Retail salespersons 301 0.341 183 0.733 
2100 Lawyers, Judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers 310 0.337 349 0.620 
7200 Automotive service technicians  and mechanics 332 0.328 419 0.574 
6230 Carpenters 355 0.315 385 0.600 
5120 Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks 367 0.306 227 0.700 
4220 Janitors and building cleaners 377 0.301 167 0.745 
4020 Cooks 390 0.294 260 0.676 
800 Accountants and auditors 400 0.287 329 0.630 
1020 Computer software engineers 457 0.228 413 0.577 
8030 Machinists 471 0.211 500 0.380 
4850 Sales representatives, wholesale and manufacturing 472 0.210 203 0.720 
1300 Architects, except naval 490 0.176 473 0.506 
1210 Mathematicians 495 0.143 501 0.333 
300 Engineering managers 499 0.103 308 0.645 
1320 Aerospace engineers 501 0.019 373 0.613 
‘A&C’ and ‘Concern’ denote O*NET attributes ‘assisting & caring for others’ and ‘concern for others’, respectively.  
COC denotes the 2002 Census occupation codes adopted in the CPS beginning in 2003. Value refers to the rescaled 
score of an occupation’s corresponding O*NET attribute ranking on a [0,1] scale. See details in the note to Table 1.
44 
 
Table 4. Pairwise Correlations of Earnings, Gender, and O*NET Occupational Attributes 
  
Ln(hourly 
earnings) 
 
 
Female 
 
Occupation  
%Female 
Concern 
For 
others 
Assist 
and 
Caring 
Caring 
factor 
index 
Develop/
Teach 
index 
Job 
skills 
index 
Work 
cond 
index 
Ln(hourly earnings) 
 
1.0         
Female 
 
-0.16 1.0        
Occupation %Female 
 
-0.13 0.61 1.0       
Concern for others 0.04 0.37 0.60 1.0      
Assisting & caring for 
others 
0.08 0.24 0.39 0.71 1.0     
Caring factor index 
 
0.07 0.33 0.54 0.93 0.93 1.0    
Developing/Teaching 
(D/T) factor index 
0.35 0.01 0.02 0.37 0.49 0.47 1.0   
Job skills factor index 0.53 0.04 0.08 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.75 1.0  
Working conditions 
factor index 
-0.20 -0.38 -0.63 -0.32 -0.08 -0.21 -0.20 -0.49 1.0 
These correlations are calculated using a pooled sample of 36 CPS-ORG monthly earnings files for female and male workers 
covering January 2006 to December 2008 merged with O*NET job attributes. Sex composition is calculated as the ratio of the 
mean number of females to mean total workers in a given occupation. Observations are not weighted by CPS sampling weights. 
Hourly wage is an implicit measure based on worker self-reports of usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours worked. 
See text for details. 
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Table 5. Wage Level Regression Estimates for Care Work Effects, by Gender, 2006 – 2008 
  Women   
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0431*  -0.0259  
 (0.0223)  (0.0220)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0967*** -0.0908***  
  (0.0211) (0.0229)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    0.0459** 
    (0.0227) 
Concern for Others    -0.0685*** 
    (0.0155) 
Job Skills Index 0.1939*** 0.2638*** 0.2683*** 0.2683*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0342) (0.0330) (0.0311) 
Working Conditions Index 0.0800** 0.0882** 0.0961*** 0.0829*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0375) (0.0356) (0.0288) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 166,009 166,009 166,009 166,009 
R-squared 0.4748 0.4813 0.4820 0.4878 
  Men   
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0885***  -0.0732***  
 (0.0163)  (0.0150)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0696*** -0.0455***  
  (0.0161) (0.0123)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    -0.0149 
    (0.0172) 
Concern for Others    -0.0490*** 
    (0.0118) 
Job Skills Index 0.1775*** 0.2039*** 0.2094*** 0.2134*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0177) (0.0154) (0.0159) 
Working Conditions Index 0.0062 0.0102 0.0132 0.0100 
 (0.0142) (0.0150) (0.0141) (0.0144) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 168,760 168,760 168,760 168,760 
R-squared 0.4971 0.4945 0.4989 0.4993 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent variable is 
ln(hourly earnings). Regression coefficients measure the wage effects of one standard deviation changes. CPS 
controls consist of detailed education attainment dummies, demographics (potential experience and its square, 
cubic, and quartic terms); dummies for marital status, race, ethnicity, foreign-born citizen, non-citizen), geographic 
dummies for region (8) and MSA size (6), broad industry (11) and broad occupation (9) dummies, year dummies, 
and dummies for union membership, public sector, and private nonprofit sector. Col (4) includes the four 
developing/teaching measures. See text for further details.  
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Table 6. Wage Level Regression Estimates for Care Work Effects by Gender, 
Absent O*NET Skill & Working Conditions Indices 
  Women   
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index 0.0181  0.0010  
 (0.0349)  (0.0375)  
Develop/Teach Index  0.0404* 0.0401*  
  (0.0209) (0.0213)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    0.0798* 
    (0.0406) 
Concern for Others    -0.0849*** 
    (0.0224) 
Job Skills Index N N N N 
Working Conditions Index N N N N 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 166,009 166,009 166,009 166,009 
R-squared 0.4415 0.4439 0.4439 0.4598 
  Men   
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0313  -0.0630***  
 (0.0203)  (0.0203)  
Develop/Teach Index  0.0333** 0.0564***  
  (0.0162) (0.0172)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    -0.0096 
    (0.0223) 
Concern for Others    -0.0457** 
    (0.0183) 
Job Skills Index N N N N 
Working Conditions Index N N N N 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 168,760 168,760 168,760 168,760 
R-squared 0.4686 0.4693 0.4726 0.4771 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent variable is 
ln(hourly earnings). The regressions in this table are identical to those shown in Table 5, except for the exclusion of 
the Job Skills and Working Condition indices. See Table5 notes. 
  
47 
 
Table 7. Wage Change Estimates for Care Work—Ind/Occ Switchers Only,  
by Gender, 2003/4 – 2008/09 
  Women   
∆ O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
∆ Caring Index -0.0137***  -0.0140***  
 (0.0043)  (0.0045)  
∆ Develop/Teach Index  -0.0016 0.0017  
  (0.0049) (0.0051)  
∆ Assisting & caring for others    -0.0058 
    (0.0039) 
∆ Concern for others    -0.0055 
    (0.0040) 
∆ Job Skills Index 0.0448*** 0.0423*** 0.0435*** 0.0433*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0073) 
∆ Working Conditions Index -0.0056 -0.0077 -0.0060 -0.0029 
 (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
∆ CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 18,981 18,981 18,981 18,981 
R-squared 0.0219 0.0213 0.0219 0.0225 
  Men   
∆ O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
∆ Caring Index -0.0184***  -0.0217***  
 (0.0046)  (0.0047)  
∆ Develop/Teach Index  0.0040 0.0097**  
  (0.0039) (0.0040)  
∆ Assisting & caring for others    -0.0106** 
    (0.0041) 
∆ Concern for others    -0.0080** 
    (0.0035) 
∆ Job Skills Index 0.0407*** 0.0331*** 0.0346*** 0.0302*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0057) 
∆ Working Conditions Index -0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0020 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
∆ CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 21,689 21,689 21,689 21,689 
R-squared 0.0257 0.0249 0.0259 0.0263 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Regression 
coefficients measure the wage effects of one standard deviation changes. ∆CPS controls consist of first differences 
in higher order terms of experience (square, cubic, and quartic), changes in union membership, public sector, 
private nonprofit sector, broad industry and broad occupation, and dummies for year pairs. All O*NET variables 
and indices are differenced. Dependent variable is ∆ln(hourly earnings).
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Table 8. Separate Wage Change Estimates for Care Work for Up-Caring and Down-Caring  
Ind/Occ Switchers, by Gender, 2003/4 – 2008/09 
  Women  
∆ Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
Up∙∆Caring index -0.0158**  -0.0166** 
 (0.0074)  (0.0075) 
Down∙∆Caring index -0.0115  -0.0114 
 (0.0074)  (0.0075) 
Up∙∆Develop/Teach index  0.0008 0.0044 
  (0.0067) (0.0068) 
Down∙∆Develop/Teach index  -0.0040 -0.0011 
  (0.0071) (0.0072) 
∆ Job Skills Index 0.0448*** 0.0423*** 0.0435*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0061) (0.0062) 
∆ Working Conditions Index -0.0057 -0.0078 -0.0060 
 (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0061) 
∆ CPS controls Y Y Y 
Observations 18,981 18,981 18,981 
R-squared 0.0220 0.0214 0.0220 
 
  Men  
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Up∙∆Caring index -0.0129  -0.0135 
 (0.0081)  (0.0082) 
Down∙∆Caring index -0.0240***  -0.0299*** 
 (0.0087)  (0.0088) 
Up∙∆Develop/Teach index  -0.0035 0.0007 
  (0.0070) (0.0071) 
Down∙∆Develop/Teach index  0.0114* 0.0186*** 
  (0.0068) (0.0070) 
∆ Job Skills Index 0.0407*** 0.0332*** 0.0347*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0049) 
∆ Working Conditions Index -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0019 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
∆ CPS controls Y Y Y 
Observations 21,689 21,689 21,689 
R-squared 0.0262 0.0255 0.0266 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. No 
differences between Up and Down Care coefficients are significant at standard levels. Regression 
coefficients measure the wage effects of one standard deviation changes.  See Table 6 for ∆CPS controls; 
see text for a detailed discussion of variables including interaction terms.
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Table 9. O*NET Caring Attribute/Index Means in the Private and Public Sectors, by Gender 
 Women Men  
Private Sector Means: mean s.d. mean s.d. ?̅?𝐹 − ?̅?𝑀  
Hourly earnings 18.22 13.66 22.75 17.96 -4.53 
Log hourly earnings 2.7237 0.5648 2.9240 0.6022 -0.2003 
Individual O*NET attributes (scaled 0-1):      
   Concern for others 0.7668 0.1105 0.6809 0.1045 0.0859 
   Assisting & caring for others 0.4456 0.1657 0.3725 0.1156 0.0731 
   Developing & building teams 0.3540 0.1283 0.3772 0.1258 -0.0232 
   Training & teaching others 0.4069 0.1218 0.4125 0.1119 -0.0056 
   Coaching & developing others 0.4111 0.1392 0.4156 0.1388 -0.0045 
   Instructing 0.5636 0.1135 0.5531 0.1001 0.0105 
O*NET Indices (using factor analysis):      
   Caring index (loads concern and asst/caring above) 0.2097 0.8753 -0.3476 0.6769 0.5573 
   Developing/Teaching index (loads remaining 4 attributes) -0.0790 0.9114 -0.0321 0.8629 -0.0469 
N 129,987 143,228  
 Women Men  
Public Sector Means: mean s.d. mean s.d. ?̅?𝐹 − ?̅?𝑀  
Hourly earnings 21.03 12.74 25.77 15.09 -4.74 
Log hourly earnings 2.9070 0.5184 3.1164 0.5093 -0.2094 
Individual O*NET attributes (scaled 0-1):      
   Concern for others 0.8244 0.1076 0.7512 0.1221 0.0732 
   Assisting & caring for others 0.5009 0.1424 0.4676 0.1610 0.0333 
   Developing & building teams 0.4188 0.1330 0.4316 0.1309 -0.0128 
   Training & teaching others 0.4991 0.1573 0.4943 0.1490 0.0048 
   Coaching & developing others 0.5125 0.1644 0.4941 0.1600 0.0184 
   Instructing 0.6493 0.1414 0.6209 0.1345 0.0284 
O*NET Indices (using factor analysis):      
   Caring index (loads concern and asst/caring above) 0.6029 0.8010 0.2172 0.8934 0.3857 
   Developing/Teaching index (loads remaining 4 attributes) 0.6180 1.1351 0.5374 1.0692 0.0806 
N 36,022 25,532  
All means are calculated from the merged 2006-2008 merged CPS/O*NET data set described in the text. 
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Table 10. Wage Level Estimates for Care Work in Public and Private Sectors by Gender, 2006 – 2008 
 Women in the private sector 
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0181  -0.0090  
 (0.0225)  (0.0229)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0700*** -0.0685***  
  (0.0207) (0.0219)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    0.0479* 
    (0.0252) 
Concern for Others    -0.0546*** 
    (0.0175) 
Job Skills Index 0.1909*** 0.2452*** 0.2474*** 0.2528*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0344) (0.0318) (0.0331) 
Working Conditions Index 0.0509 0.0620 0.0653* 0.0604** 
 (0.0340) (0.0391) (0.0342) (0.0290) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 129,987 129,987 129,987 129,987 
R-squared 0.4804 0.4842 0.4842 0.4892 
 Men in the private sector  
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0640***  -0.0539***  
 (0.0183)  (0.0171)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0487*** -0.0354***  
  (0.0146) (0.0116)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    -0.0199 
    (0.0194) 
Concern for Others    -0.0289*** 
    (0.0108) 
Job Skills Index 0.1706*** 0.1921*** 0.1966*** 0.1944*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0183) (0.0166) (0.0170) 
Working Conditions Index -0.0067 -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0009 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0143) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 143,228 143,228 143,228 143,228 
R-squared 0.5066 0.5056 0.5076 0.5077 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 10 (continued). Wage Level Estimates for Care Work in Public and Private Sectors by Gender 
 Women in the public sector 
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0844***  -0.0572***  
 (0.0213)  (0.0192)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.1196*** -0.0970***  
  (0.0190) (0.0224)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    0.0133 
    (0.0192) 
Concern for Others    -0.0712*** 
    (0.0140) 
Job Skills Index 0.1996*** 0.2804*** 0.2799*** 0.2582*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0370) (0.0368) (0.0389) 
Working Conditions Index 0.1312*** 0.1410*** 0.1507*** 0.1282*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0330) (0.0332) (0.0303) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 36,022 36,022 36,022 36,022 
R-squared 0.4512 0.4556 0.4599 0.4636 
 Men in the public sector 
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.1058***  -0.0916***  
 (0.0128)  (0.0131)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0912*** -0.0344**  
  (0.0173) (0.0160)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    -0.0113 
    (0.0149) 
Concern for Others    -0.0657*** 
    (0.0117) 
Job Skills Index 0.1882*** 0.2222*** 0.2122*** 0.2052*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0167) 
Working Conditions Index 0.0303** 0.0346* 0.0355** 0.0231 
 (0.0153) (0.0193) (0.0163) (0.0143) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 25,532 25,532 25,532 25,532 
R-squared 0.4355 0.4245 0.4366 0.4397 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Regression coefficients 
measure the wage effects of one standard deviation changes. CPS controls consist of detailed education attainment 
dummies, demographics (potential experience and its square, cubic, and quartic terms; dummies for marital status, race, 
ethnicity, foreign-born citizen, non-citizen), geographic dummies for region (8) and size (6), broad  industry (11; private 
sector only) and broad occupation (9) dummies,  and private non-profit (private sector only). Dependent variable is 
ln(hourly earnings), see text for a detailed description of variables. 
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Table 11. Quantile Regression Wage Level Estimates for Care Work—by Gender, 2006 – 2008 
   Women, N=166,009   
O*NET Caring Indices OLS/Table 5 QR-p10 QR-p25 QR-p50 QR-p75 QR-p90 
Caring Index -0.0431* -0.0522 -0.0500 -0.0434 -0.0437 -0.0458 
 (0.0223) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0031) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0967*** -0.0787 -0.0898 -0.0954 -0.0998 -0.1031 
 (0.0211) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0033) 
Caring Index -0.0259 -0.0372 -0.0348 -0.0284 -0.0289 -0.0296 
 (0.0220) (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0032) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0908*** -0.0693 -0.0818 -0.0890 -0.0944 -0.0965 
 (0.0229) (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0035) 
   Men, N=168,760 
O*NET Caring Indices OLS/Table 5 QR-p10 QR-p25 QR-p50 QR-p75 QR-p90 
Caring Index -0.0885*** -0.1182 -0.1084 -0.0964 -0.0722 -0.0473 
 (0.0163) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0034) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0696*** -0.0637 -0.0692 -0.0690 -0.0646 -0.0588 
 (0.0161) (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0033) 
Caring Index -0.0732*** -0.1071 -0.0957 -0.0819 -0.0577 -0.0327 
 (0.0150) (0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0036) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0455*** -0.0305 -0.0384 -0.0434 -0.0475 -0.0494 
 (0.0123) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0036) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 for OLS only. Standard errors for OLS are clustered by occupation. QR 
standard errors not clustered and QR significance levels not shown. “QR-pN” designates quantile regression 
results at the Nth percentile. See Table 5 notes for independent variables.
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Table 12. Wage Level and Wage Change Estimates for Care Work by Predicted Wage Quintile 
 Wage Level Regression Estimates, 2006-2008 
 Women 
O*NET Caring Indices Table 5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Caring Index -0.0431* -0.0301 -0.0472** -0.0413* -0.0441** -0.0430** 
 (0.0223) (0.0183) (0.0202) (0.0245) (0.0215) (0.0175) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0967*** -0.0156 -0.0625*** -0.0939*** -0.1138*** -0.1239*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0208) (0.0216) (0.0246) (0.0255) 
Caring Index -0.0259 -0.0310* -0.0441** -0.0293 -0.0143 0.0004 
 (0.0220) (0.0184) (0.0203) (0.0243) (0.0223) (0.0168) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0908*** -0.0175 -0.0598*** -0.0892*** -0.1092*** -0.1240*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0197) (0.0192) (0.0221) (0.0281) (0.0285) 
Observations 166,009 33,202 33,202 33,202 33,202 33,201 
 Men 
Caring Index -0.0885*** -0.0302** -0.0768*** -0.0818*** -0.0916*** -0.0686*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0127) (0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0192) (0.0192) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0696*** -0.0140 -0.0341*** -0.0440*** -0.0818*** -0.1019*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0127) (0.0113) (0.0120) (0.0177) (0.0180) 
Caring Index -0.0732*** -0.0288** -0.0718*** -0.0743*** -0.0719*** -0.0330* 
 (0.0150) (0.0130) (0.0146) (0.0140) (0.0176) (0.0177) 
Develop/Teach Index -0.0455*** -0.0114 -0.0201** -0.0243** -0.0542*** -0.0854*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0127) (0.0101) (0.0094) (0.0142) (0.0192) 
Observations 168,760 33,752 33,752 33,752 33,752 33,752 
 Wage Change Estimates for Ind/Occ Switchers, 2003/4 - 2008/9 
 Women 
O*NET Caring Indices Table 7 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
∆ Caring Index  -0.0137*** -0.0148 -0.0066 0.0013 -0.0223*** -0.0171* 
 (0.0043) (0.0096) (0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0086) (0.0090) 
∆ Develop/Teach Index -0.0016 0.0301*** -0.0026 -0.0095 -0.0020 -0.0125 
 (0.0049) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0103) 
∆ Caring Index  -0.0140*** -0.0164* -0.0064 0.0033 -0.0236*** -0.0148 
 (0.0045) (0.0097) (0.0104) (0.0098) (0.0091) (0.0096) 
∆ Develop/Teach Index  0.0017 0.0310*** -0.0020 -0.0101 0.0047 -0.0063 
 (0.0051) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0110) 
Observations 18,981 3,797 3,796 3,796 3,796 3,796 
 Men 
∆ Caring Index  -0.0184*** -0.0157 -0.0430*** 0.0020 -0.0102 -0.0236** 
 (0.0046) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0097) (0.0100) 
∆ Develop/Teach Index 0.0040 0.0057 -0.0129 0.0164* 0.0004 0.0074 
 (0.0039) (0.0083) (0.0093) (0.0091) (0.0087) (0.0099) 
∆ Caring Index  -0.0216*** -0.0168 -0.0416*** -0.0036 -0.0119 -0.0326*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
∆ Develop/Teach Index  0.0096** 0.0074 -0.0051 0.0173* 0.0042 0.0207** 
 (0.0040) (0.0083) (0.0098) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0103) 
Observations 21,689 4,338 4,338 4,338 4,338 4,337 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation in wage level results (top half of table) and by occupation-
pair in wage change results (bottom half).  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Wage quintiles are based on predicted 
log wage from wage level estimates (excluding job attributes) using the 2006-2008 CPS sample in the top half of 
the table and in the bottom half the initial CPS panel year samples, 2003/4-2008/9. Covariates include 
demographic, education, and geographic variables, plus year dummies. All estimates are OLS. 
54 
 
Table 13. Wage Level Estimates for Care Work Effects for Selected Groups, 2006 – 2008 
 Women, N=166,009 Men, N=168,760 
 
Group 
 
N 
mean 
caring 
caring 
estimate 
 
N 
mean 
caring  
caring 
estimate 
Full-time  130,924 0.2690 -0.0383* 157,672 -0.2696 -0.0741*** 
Part-time 35,085 0.3920 0.0284 11,088 -0.1566 -0.0364* 
Hourly workers 99,951 0.2480 -0.0015 93,086 -0.3760 -0.0489*** 
Salaried workers 66,058 0.3662 -0.0392** 75,674 -0.1222 -0.0647*** 
Non-Hispanic white 123,125 0.3333 -0.0193 123,963 -0.2402 -0.0697*** 
Non-Hispanic Black 15,199 0.2944 -0.0484*** 11,101 -0.1778 -0.0896*** 
Non-Hispanic other 10,519 0.2087 -0.0281 10,625 -0.2723 -0.0746*** 
Hispanic 17,166 0.0738 -0.0469** 23,071 -0.4162 -0.0578*** 
Native citizen 147,637 0.3232 -0.0245 143,851 -0.2354 -0.0711*** 
Foreign-born citizen 8,208 0.2190 -0.0345 8,207 -0.2889 -0.0666*** 
Foreign-born non-citizen 10,164 -0.0527 -0.0290 16,702 -0.4793 -0.0728*** 
Ages 18-24  15,638 0.1684 -0.0133 17,230 -0.3925 -0.0419*** 
Ages 25-34 38,197 0.3089 -0.0146 41,327 -0.2804 -0.0560*** 
Ages 35-44 41,823 0.2906 -0.0234 43,532 -0.2469 -0.0555*** 
Ages 45-54 44,166 0.3076 -0.0389 41,707 -0.2511 -0.0764*** 
Ages 55-65 26,185 0.3361 -0.0286 24,964 -0.1870 -0.0929*** 
Never married 38,147 0.2125 -0.0232 43,869 -0.3124 -0.0662*** 
Ever-married 127,862 0.3196 -0.0278 124,891 -0.2445 -0.0738*** 
HS dropout 10,745 -0.1642 -0.0476** 17,840 -0.5394 -0.0332*** 
HS graduate –no college 45,311 0.0452 -0.0653*** 51,936 -0.4125 -0.0667*** 
Some college 52,555 0.3351 -0.0228 46,348 -0.2507 -0.0607*** 
BA/BS degree 38,142 0.4614 -0.0023 34,787 -0.1369 -0.0614*** 
Graduate/professional/doctoral degree 19,256 0.7003 0.0122 17,849 0.1784 -0.0131 
Large metro (pop ≥ million) 20,426 0.2781 -0.0449* 21,258 -0.2464 -0.0818*** 
Small metro (100K ≤ pop < 5million) 99,490 0.2862 -0.0247 101,266 -0.2601 -0.0745*** 
CPS non-metro 46,093 0.3215 -0.0095 46,236 -0.2739 -0.0552*** 
Private for-profit 111,600 0.1088 -0.0138 135,439 -0.3994 -0.0396*** 
Private not-for-profit 18,387 0.8221 0.0097 7,789 0.5527 -0.0432* 
Public 36,022 0.6029 -0.0572*** 25,532 0.2172 -0.0916*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.01 using standard errors clustered on occupation. “Mean caring” is mean of the O*NET 
caring index. “Caring estimate” is the wage regression coefficient on the caring index. Regression model used is similar to 
Table 5 Column 3. See Table 5 notes.  
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Appendix Tables  
 
Table A-1. Coefficients (s.e.) for O*NET D/T Attributes and Selected Control Variables  
to Accompany Table 5 Regression Results for Women and Men 
  Women   
Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Developing and Building Teams    -0.0185 
    (0.0205) 
Training and Teaching Others    -0.0745*** 
    (0.0204) 
Coaching and Developing Others    0.0164 
    (0.0250) 
Instructing    -0.0466*** 
    (0.0169) 
Married, spouse present 0.0407*** 0.0416*** 0.0422*** 0.0428*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0044) 
Separated/widowed/divorced 0.0116*** 0.0099** 0.0107*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Black -0.0718*** -0.0752*** -0.0741*** -0.0727*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0083) 
Other race -0.0155* -0.0189** -0.0192*** -0.0217*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0066) 
Hispanic -0.0803*** -0.0788*** -0.0779*** -0.0767*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0068) 
Foreign-born citizen -0.0367*** -0.0400*** -0.0399*** -0.0394*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0075) 
Foreign-born noncitizen -0.1313*** -0.1301*** -0.1316*** -0.1287*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0126) 
Experience 0.0381*** 0.0384*** 0.0382*** 0.0377*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) 
Experience2 -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Part-time (hours<35) -0.0966*** -0.1005*** -0.0975*** -0.0961*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0166) (0.0150) (0.0144) 
Public 0.0363 0.0743*** 0.0672*** 0.0901*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0245) (0.0254) (0.0268) 
Private not-for-profit -0.0207 -0.0112 -0.0129 -0.0157 
 (0.0221) (0.0202) (0.0213) (0.0200) 
Union member 0.1185*** 0.1283*** 0.1301*** 0.1376*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0113) 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. See Table 5 notes. 
(Table A-1 continued on next page) 
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Table A-1 (continued).Coefficients (s.e.) for O*NET D/T Attributes and Selected Control 
Variables to Accompany Table 5 Regression Results Women and Men 
  Men   
Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Developing and Building Teams    -0.0069 
    (0.0120) 
Training and Teaching Others    -0.0183 
    (0.0190) 
Coaching and Developing Others    -0.0172 
    (0.0192) 
Instructing    -0.0184 
    (0.0139) 
Married,spouse present 0.1249*** 0.1252*** 0.1244*** 0.1241*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
Separated/widowed/divorced 0.0416*** 0.0405*** 0.0409*** 0.0409*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
Black -0.1319*** -0.1370*** -0.1311*** -0.1312*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0075) 
Other race -0.0421*** -0.0425*** -0.0433*** -0.0437*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0100) (0.0097) 
Hispanic -0.1149*** -0.1172*** -0.1136*** -0.1132*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0075) 
Foreign-born citizen -0.0464*** -0.0465*** -0.0471*** -0.0475*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0083) 
Foreign-born noncitizen -0.1325*** -0.1292*** -0.1317*** -0.1316*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
Experience 0.0350*** 0.0349*** 0.0350*** 0.0351*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
Experience2 -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Part-time (hours<35) -0.1588*** -0.1647*** -0.1569*** -0.1562*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0154) (0.0149) (0.0151) 
Public 0.0937** 0.0945* 0.0967** 0.1023** 
 (0.0468) (0.0487) (0.0437) (0.0440) 
Private not-for-profit -0.1023*** -0.1072*** -0.0961*** -0.0989*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0372) (0.0324) (0.0331) 
Union member 0.1886*** 0.1839*** 0.1907*** 0.1926*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0142) (0.0131) (0.0127) 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. See Table 5 notes. 
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Table A-2. Wage Level Regression Estimates for Care Work Effects Using the Longitudinal  
Sample of Ind/Occ Switchers, Initial Year of 2003/4 – 2008/09 Panels 
  Women   
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0604***  -0.0523***  
 (0.0126)  (0.0126)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0507*** -0.0362***  
  (0.0121) (0.0114)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    -0.0102 
    (0.0136) 
Concern for Others    -0.0330*** 
    (0.0108) 
Job Skills Index 0.1580*** 0.1843*** 0.1872*** 0.1889*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0170) (0.0159) (0.0187) 
Working Conditions Index -0.0131 -0.0132 -0.0044 -0.0035 
 (0.0173) (0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0178) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 18,981 18,981 18,981 18,981 
R-squared 0.4215 0.4194 0.4229 0.4236 
  Men   
O*NET Variables/Indices (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Caring Index -0.0661***  -0.0621***  
 (0.0090)  (0.0088)  
Develop/Teach Index  -0.0303*** -0.0112  
  (0.0092) (0.0073)  
Assisting and Caring for Others    -0.0329*** 
    (0.0083) 
Concern for Others    -0.0203*** 
    (0.0072) 
Job Skills Index 0.1303*** 0.1357*** 0.1382*** 0.1408*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0110) (0.0100) (0.0112) 
Working Conditions Index -0.0140 -0.0118 -0.0121 -0.0129 
 (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0098) 
CPS controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 21,689 21,689 21,689 21,689 
R-squared 0.4780 0.4750 0.4782 0.4783 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by occupation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent variable is 
ln(hourly earnings). See Table 5 notes for CPS controls; see text for a detailed description of variables.  
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Table A-3. Coefficients (s.e.) for O*NET D/T Attributes and Selected Control Variables to  
Accompany Table 7 Wage Change Regression Results—Ind/Occ Switchers (Women) 
  Women   
∆ Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
∆ Developing & building teams    -0.0034 
    (0.0050) 
∆ Training & teaching others    -0.0136** 
    (0.0054) 
∆ Coaching & developing others    0.0147** 
    (0.0057) 
∆ Instructing    0.0030 
    (0.0047) 
∆ experience2 -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
∆ part-time (hours<35) -0.0078 -0.0081 -0.0078 -0.0076 
 (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) 
∆ union 0.0740*** 0.0734*** 0.0740*** 0.0737*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) 
∆ public sector -0.0012 0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0020 
 (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
∆ private not-for-profit -0.0181 -0.0180 -0.0182 -0.0186* 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
  Men   
     
∆ Developing & building teams    0.0060 
    (0.0040) 
∆ Training & teaching others    -0.0068 
    (0.0050) 
∆ Coaching & developing others    0.0094* 
    (0.0053) 
∆ Instructing    0.0041 
    (0.0043) 
∆ experience2 -0.0024** -0.0024** -0.0024** -0.0024* 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
∆ part-time (hours<35) -0.0263*** -0.0262*** -0.0263*** -0.0263*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083) 
∆ union 0.0835*** 0.0826*** 0.0830*** 0.0831*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
∆ public sector 0.0118 0.0077 0.0108 0.0118 
 (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) 
∆ private not-for-profit -0.0234 -0.0279 -0.0238 -0.0235 
 (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0174) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. See detailed notes for Table 7. Results for ∆experience3, ∆experience4, broad 
industry and occupation changes, and year-pairs are not shown. 
